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One of the cornerstones of most economic and asset pricing models is how decision-
makers evaluate risk. Despite the fact that almost everyone faces risk in their lives
and it is a crucial ingredient in economic models including asset pricing models, it
is still an open debate how decision-makers or even investors evaluate risk. A large
body of research assumes the standard expected utility framework to model the risk
attitude of people and investors. However, experimental and empirical evidence
shows that the standard expected utility theory falls short of explaining many
economic and asset pricing phenomena. Behavioral finance provides alternative
conceptual frameworks to explain these phenomena.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the potential impacts of the expected utility theory
with an aspiration level on stock returns. Expected utility theory with an aspiration
level departs from the standard expected utility theory. It assumes that achieving a
given aspiration level generates an additional utility for the decision-maker yielding
several implications different from those of the standard expected utility theory.
For instance, marathon runners set a target time as an aspiration level, cabdrivers
set a daily target for their income as an aspiration level, and investors might set
an aspiration level return for a given time period which could explain why stocks
have much higher expected returns than bonds (equity premium puzzle).
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Motivated by this evidence, I investigate whether this conceptual framework
can also shed light on predicting the cross-section of expected stock returns. I
hypothesize that stocks that have higher probability of achieving the aspiration
level return are more preferred, yielding a lower expected return. I find a significant
negative relation between the probability of success and the expected stock return
consistent with the hypothesis.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the impact of the law of small numbers on stock
returns. According to the law of small numbers, people tend to infer too much
from a small sample. For instance, people tend to believe that prior signals predict
immediate reversal, while they also seem to believe that an unlikely long streak is
a sign for continuation. The first phenomenon is known as the gambler’s fallacy,
while the second phenomenon is known as the hot-hand fallacy.
I assume that these phenomena might have an impact on stock returns as well
and I test how these errors in the perception of risk can influence the risk-return
trade-off. I find a significant and robust relation between the risk-return trade-off
and prior signals of stocks consistent with these behavioral phenomena.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the relation between time discounting and risk
taking in an experiment. Standard expected utility theory assumes independence
between risk taking and time discounting yielding puzzling experimental and empirical
results in behavioral finance literature. We test a model in an experiment that
provides a theoretical framework for explaining these puzzling results. We also
find evidence on the relation between risk taking and time discounting and we find
supporting evidence for the model.
2
Chapter 1
Aspiration Level Theory and Stock
Returns: An Empirical Test
1.1 Introduction
Imagine an investor who sets a target return in his mind which makes any opportunity
more appealing for him which achieves that target. For instance, managers might
disregard investment opportunities which don’t achieve a certain target return
with high probability (Payne et al., 1980;1981).
Several researches find that the decision-maker usually focuses on achieving
an aspiration level in several different fields of economic decisions to simplify
complex decisions (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006). Farmers seem
to minimize the probability of falling below an aspiration level (Lopes, 1987),
cabdrivers set a daily target as an aspiration level (Camerer et al., 1997), marathon
runners set an aspiration level for finishing time (Allen et al., 2016), or even in
experiments, decision-makers try to achieve a target mean return or a specific
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aspiration level (Payne et al., 1980; Baucells and Heukamp, 2006). This approach
is even used in financial regulations when the probability of “failure” is required to
be less than a certain level (Value-at-Risk, VaR) (Dowd, 1998).
Building on this intuition, I assume that investors also pay attention to aspiration
level returns. For instance, it might be important for an investor to beat the market
return or the industry average return. I define the measure of the probability of
success as the probability of achieving the aspiration level. As a consequence, I
construct the measure of the probability of success as the percentage of the daily
returns in the last month that achieved the aspiration level return. The motivation
of achieving the aspiration level return could play an important role for more
sophisticated investors as well. Their performances at a trader level and also at an
institutional level are usually benchmarked to a certain index. Nevertheless, this
approach of aspiration level theory does not reject the expected utility framework
(Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008). Thus, it shouldn’t be considered as irrational
behavior to aim for an aspiration level. These arguments suggest that the results
of the probability of success measure might not be only driven by naive investors
and not more pronounced among stocks with large limits to arbitrage.
Although the intuition that investors have an aspiration level might be realistic
and supported by several experiments, identifying such an aspiration level in an
empirical setting for stock returns presents a serious challenge. Survey results
or ownership data would provide only indirect evidence on any aspiration level.
Additionally, the aspiration level could be also market-wide or individual stock
specific and it may also differ for each investor. All these challenges make it
impossible to provide a clear identification strategy for the aspiration level. As a
consequence, in this study, I can not provide a clear identification for aspiration
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level returns. Thus, this approach can only provide an imperfect measure. I
only provide explorative analyses in which I investigate the effect of four different
aspiration levels such as a zero return, the risk-free rate, the market return, and
the industry average return.
I find evidence for the prediction of aspiration level theory. Stocks with a
higher probability of success have a lower expected return, while stocks with a
lower probability of success have a higher expected return in the cross-section of
U.S. stock returns. It remains both economically and statistically significant for
stocks with small arbitrage costs and even among stocks with high institutional
ownership. It all suggests that the implication of an aspiration level is not only
valid for retail investors and stocks with high limits to arbitrage. Finally, the
measure is similar to several other known variables that are usually considered to
be related to microstructure effects. Additional tests show that the results of the
probability of success is not related to these potential microstructure effects.
The assumption that investors might pay attention to an aspiration level has a
large literature. Beyond experimental and empirical evidence, there is an ongoing
debate about defining risk in both theory and practice. The definition of risk as
not achieving the aspiration level is already documented for a long time by both
scholars and practitioners (Mao, 1970). This literature inspired Diecidue and Van
De Ven (2008) to establish the conceptual framework of aspiration level theory as
the probability of failure and success. Levy and Levy (2009) propose a similar
model to Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) but in their model there is only the
probability of failure. Levy and Levy (2009) interpret their model as a weighted
average of a standard expected utility and a safety first model. According to the
safety first approach (Roy, 1952), the investor considers some outcomes below a
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certain level as an unacceptable disaster which he prefers to avoid at all costs. In
the approach of Levy and Levy (2009), an outcome below the aspiration level is
not unacceptable but provides a fixed substantial loss. This approach provides an
explanation for the equity premium puzzle (Levy and Levy, 2009).
Using the aspiration level that the decision-maker would like to achieve is a
similar concept to the use of a reference-point such as in prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Suffering a fixed loss by failing
the aspiration level (or gaining the fixed utility by achieving the aspiration level)
is similar to the property of loss-aversion in prospect theory. However, aspiration
level theory is different from prospect theory in several aspects. First, in aspiration
level theory, if an outcome is below the aspiration level then the decision-maker
suffers a fixed utility loss (not gaining a fixed utility) independently from the
distance from the aspiration level. In contrast, in prospect theory the value
depends on the distance from the reference point. For instance, in aspiration
level theory, there is no difference if the realized return is 1% below the target
return or 15% below the target return. In contrast, the loss-aversion property
of prospect theory implies that there is a difference between realizing a 1% or a
15% lower return than the reference point. Second, aspiration level theory can be
rationalized in the expected utility framework (Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008).
Third, aspiration level theory does not necessarily imply risk-seeking behavior if all
outcomes are below the aspiration level, while prospect theory implies risk-seeking
behavior if all outcomes are below the reference point.
An aspiration level already defines the probability of success in a theoretical
framework where all the possible states of the world and their payoffs are well-
defined. In each decision, the decision-maker benefits from an additional fixed
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utility if the payoff achieves the aspiration level in a given realization. Thus,
the decision-maker considers the total probability of the sates in which she can
achieve the aspiration level because in these states she can derive the additional
fixed utility. As a consequence, this total probability is the probability of success
for her.
Theoretical works find that, for instance, prospect theory can explain higher
volatility or predictability (Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001), preference for
skewness (Barberis and Huang, 2008), or the role of heterogeneity in asset prices
(Easley and Yang, 2015), while empirical works find that, for instance, prospect
theory can be a reason why stocks with potential high upsides are overpriced
(Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011), the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle could be
related to gain and loss asymmetry proposed by prospect theory (Bhootra and Hur,
2015), and prospect theory has implications for the cross-section of stock-returns
(Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang, 2016). Barberis (2013) provides an overview of
the applications of prospect theory to economics and finance.
Prospect theory and its possible impacts on asset prices have been investigated
in the literature of behavioral finance, while the influence of the aspiration level
theory on asset prices and its descriptive validity in the data hasn’t been investigated
so far, despite its appealing and simple features.
Proposing a new factor raises concerns of data mining in the literature. Harvey,
Liu, and Zhu (2016) propose two additional requirements for testing new factors.
First, there should be a conceptual framework behind the new factor. Second,
the absolute value of t-statistics should be above 3. Although my measure is
imperfect for identifying the aspiration level and the probability of success, there
is a theoretical motivation (e.g., Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) and Levy and
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Levy (2009)) for such a measure. Second, the results for the probability of success
measure have a substantially larger absolute values than 3 as the tables report in
the firm-level regressions and portfolio-level analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
conceptual framework of the aspiration level theory and experimental results that
highlight the main differences compared to other theories. Section 3 describes
a model with an aspiration level and its implication. Section 4 describes the
construction of measure. Section 5 discusses the data and the results of the
empirical tests and robustness tests of the implication on the probability of success
in the cross-section of stock returns. Finally, section 6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I present the conceptual framework of the aspiration level theory
and I also discuss the evidence and application for narrow framing in asset prices.
Narrow framing implies that the investor evaluates each choice separately when
he faces several concurrent choices such as in an asset pricing setting.
To present the conceptual framework of Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008),
there are S states of nature, s = 1 . . . S each occurring with probability πs,
where
∑
s πs = 1. Imagine that there are risky lotteries with a discrete payoff
distribution X which pays xs in state s. There is also an aspiration level payoff
x̄ which the decision-maker would like to achieve. This aspiration level payoff
divides the outcomes into two groups, namely, the outcomes below the aspiration
level payoff and the outcomes above or equal to the aspiration level payoff1. The
1Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) defines the set of outcomes which are below the aspiration
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probability of success is given for a lottery j with payoff distribution Xj by
PSj(x̄) = 1 − P (Xj < x̄). This approach provides the following specification
of the expected utility function with a loading of λ > 0 on the utility gain of
achieving the aspiration level:
V (X) = E(u(X)) + λPS(x̄) = E(u(X) + λ1[x̄,∞)(X)) (1.1)
where 1[x̄,−∞,)(X) is the usual indicator function of achieving the aspiration level.
This indicator function has a value of zero when the outcome is strictly below the
aspiration level, while the value of the indicator function is one when the outcome
is above or equal to the aspiration level. Incorporating such an aspiration level
into a utility function still leads to an expected utility representation (see for more
details Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) and Levy and Levy (2009)).
To demonstrate the explanatory power of aspiration level theory, consider the
experiment of Payne (2005) where a five-outcome gamble was presented to the
subjects. The outcomes of the gamble were $100, $50, $0, −$25, −$50 each with
equal chance. In the first case, the subjects could choose between adding $38 to the
outcome of $100 or to the outcome of $0. The majority chose to add the $38 to the
outcome of $0. In the second case, the subjects could choose between adding the
same $38 to the outcome of $100 or to the outcome of $50. In the second case, there
was no significant difference between choosing the different options. Payne (2005)
concludes that standard expected utility theory (without discontinuity) does not
offer a description for such a choice pattern (Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008),
level and the probability of failure P (x < x̄) and the set of outcomes that are above the aspiration
level. I use a simplified version where only achieving the aspiration level generates a positive
value. Levy and Levy (2009) use a similar approach but in their asset pricing application and
experimental tests only the probability of failure plays a role.
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while aspiration level theory explains this behavior by increasing the possibility to
achieve the aspiration level of $0 in the first case, while it is not possible anymore
in the second case. Prospect theory does not offer an explanation for this behavior
either. Prospect theory would imply that the subjects should have preferred to
increase the payoff of the best outcome ($100) compared to the outcome of $0.
In another experiment (Levy and Levy, 2009), subjects could choose between a
gamble with the payoffs of -$80,000, $10,000, $20,000, $150,000 with equal chance
and a gamble with the payoffs of −$30,000,−$10,000, −$5,000, $145,000 with
equal chance. The majority of the subjects (74.7%) chose the first gamble even
though a decision-maker with mean-variance preferences would choose the second
gamble and a decision-maker with prospect theory preferences also would choose
the second gamble. There is no such a large loss-aversion parameter which would
explain this experimental result (Levy and Levy, 2009). However, the aspiration
level theory provides an explanation for this pattern by assuming that the decision-
maker has an aspiration level at zero. Furthermore, using the estimated parameter
in the experiment, the aspiration level theory can account for the equity premium
puzzle as well (Levy and Levy, 2009). Although their estimated parameter for
λ = 0.1 might seem to be small, it generates a large equity premium reconciling the
problem that standard expected utility theory (without discontinuity) alone can
not account for the observation that decision-makers reject small stake gambles,
while they accept large stake gambles (Rabin, 2000).
To provide an even more direct relationship between the choices and the probability
of success, Venkatraman, Payne, and Huettel (2014) used eye-tracking technology
to observe the behavior of the decision-makers in experiments. They also find
supporting evidence that decision-makers use the probability of success as an
10
important aspect in their risky decisions.
Finally, to differentiate the probability of success, prospect theory, salience
theory (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013), and preference for positive skewness,
Zeisberger (2016) provides a series of experiments in which the subjects played an
investment game. He finds consistently that subjects preferred the investment
which had a higher probability of success compared to the investment which had
a lower probability of success but a more positively skewed distribution, a higher
expected return, a lower volatility, and a higher prospect theory value. Thus, the
first investment was worse in all these aspects except in the probability of success
and it was still the preferred investment option (see Table 1.1). This result is robust
for several different specifications. He finds the same results for repeated games,
one-shot games, experience based probabilities, known probabilities, and several
other specifications. In addition, the results remain significant even after allowing
for performance feedback. It suggests that the decision-makers pay attention to
the overall probability of success in risky decisions even in experiments very similar
to real investment problems.
These experimental results are also in line with the characteristics of the stocks.
To present similar comparisons among stocks, I sort stocks based on the probability
of success in each month based on the last month daily returns. I form a portfolio
of stocks based on the highest 20% of the probability of success in each month,
while I form another portfolio of stocks that are among the 40% lowest probability
of success in each month and with a higher value of cumulative prospect theory
value of −0.0065 based on the last month daily returns.
Table 1.2 presents the characteristics of the two portfolios. It demonstrates that
stocks exhibit similar patterns as observed in experiments. Stocks in portfolio
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Table 1.1: This Table presents one of the investment games in the series of
experiments of Zeisberger (2016). It demonstrates that subjects invests in the
option which has a lower expected return, a higher variance, a less positively
skewed distribution, and a lower cumulative prospect theory value (with Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) specification and parameters) but a higher probability of
success (defined as the probability of achieving a positive outcome). All outcomes
had equal chance to occur.
High Success Low Success
Outcomes −12%, 0.5%, 1%, 14% −9%, −1%, −0.5%, 15%
Probability of Success 75% 25%
Expected Return 0.88% 1.13%
Variance 0.85% 0.76%
Skewness 0.07 1.07
CPT value −0.047 −0.035
A are overvalued (by having lower expected return) with a high probability of
success even though they have a lower cumulative prospect theory value and a
lower skewness than stocks with a low probability of success but a higher CPT
value and skewness. Portfolio A earns 0.54% return per month on average (6.68%
per year) with a volatility of 2.8% (44.45% annualized volatility), while portfolio
B earns 1.16% per month on average (14.84% per year) with a volatility of 2.6%
(41.27% annualized volatility). In the results section, I investigate the relationship
between the measure of probability of success and several known characteristics
including CPT value and skewness in more detail.
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Table 1.2: This Table presents the average values of the characteristics of two
portfolios. Portfolio A consists the stocks with the 20% highest probability of
success in each month based on the last month daily returns, while portfolio
B consists the stocks with the 40% lowest probability of success but a
higher cumulative prospect theory value (with Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
specification and parameters) than −0.0065. It demonstrates that stocks with
a less positively skewed distribution, and a lower cumulative prospect theory
value (with Tversky and Kahneman (1992) specification and parameters) but
a higher probability of success yields a lower expected return (these stocks are
overvalued) than stocks with a more positively skewed distribution, and a higher
cumulative prospect theory value. Thus, these stocks suggest that experimental
results are in line with asset pricing data. The average probability of success,
volatility, skewness, and CPT value based on the last month daily returns are
reported for both portfolios and their differences with the corresponding t-statistic
in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations.
A B
High Success Low Success Diff
Probability of Success 62% 40% 22%
(1000)
Volatility 0.028% 0.026% 0.002%
(14.03)
Skewness 0.13 0.65 −0.52
(−151.58)
CPT Value −0.0065 −0.0003 −0.0062
(−129.51)




The application of the results of experimental studies to asset pricing usually
raises some questions. One of the most crucial questions is how to define the non-
consumption source of utility. For instance, in the application of the loss-aversion
property of prospect theory, there is the question whether loss-aversion should be
defined over wealth, over a portfolio, or over individual stocks (Barberis and Huang,
2001). In the case of aspiration level theory, this question is also relevant. Should
the aspiration level be defined over the portfolio or over each stock separately?
According to mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980), the investor could evaluate
his investment “broadly” when he considers the total effect of his investments as
a portfolio or “narrowly” when he evaluates the individual stocks separately. The
results of experimental studies (e.g., Kahneman and Tverksy, 1981; Redelmeier and
Tversky,1992; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et
al. 1997; Benartzi and Thaler 1999; Rabin and Thaler, 2001) suggest that decision-
makers apply narrow-framing.
Furthermore, assuming narrow framing in several different models in asset
prices can shed light on the stock market participation puzzle (Barberis, Huang,
and Thaler, 2006), the equity premium puzzle (Barberis and Huang, 2006), the
stock investment decisions (Kumar and Lim, 2008), the taste for skewness, the
growth-value puzzle, and the time varying risk premia (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer, 2013).
Following these approaches, I also assume narrow framing and I define aspiration
level over individual stocks.
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1.3 Asset Prices and Aspiration Level
In this section, I consider a one-period model in which there is a price taking
representative investor with two sources of utility. Following Barberis and Huang
(2001), the investor derives utility from consumption and from a non-consumption
source. The non-consumption source of utility can be interpreted in different
ways. Barberis and Huang (2001) argue that the investor may experience a sense
of regret over his decisions, or it might hurt his ego which makes him suffer in
the case of loss-aversion. Similarly, this non-consumption source of utility might
also be interpreted as a potential humiliation in front of friends or family. In my
approach, achieving the aspiration level could be interpreted as a utility from an
experience of a good decision or a potential opportunity to use as an argument in
a discussion in front of a colleague or friend. In this model, the investor formulates
a probability of success value for each asset j based on the past returns (PSj).
Although several researches use the assumption that investors use a forward-
looking representation of stock returns in this paper I follow the approach of
Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016)2. I also assume that the representative
agent forms a mental representation of the stock by the distribution of its past
returns and he formulates the probability of success based on this representation
of an asset j (PSj). In this specification, I assume that the probability of success
2Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wand (2016) provide a model for incorporating prospect theory
value based on the stocks’ past returns into a traditional mean-variance framework. They assume
that some investors hold the tangency portfolio, while other investors hold the tangency portfolio
by tilting their holdings towards stocks with higher prospect theory value based on historical
returns. Thus, they assume that the investors use backward-looking representation of the stock
returns. Their model could be also applied in this case by assuming that some of the investors
hold the tangency portfolio by tilting their holding towards stocks with higher probability of
success based on past returns. This approach yields the same implication compared to the
implication presented in this section.
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for the risk-free rate is zero.
In the model, there are two time periods t = 0, 1 and I assume that the investor
derives utility from consumption in the two time periods and he can derive an
additional utility gain from achieving the aspiration level for an asset. The price
of each available asset j = 1 . . . J is pj. I assume that there is no discounting and
the utility is time separable, additive, monotonically increasing in consumption,
the first order derivative exists and it is positive, and the second order derivative
exists and it is non-positive. At t = 0, the investor has an endowment of e0 of
the consumption good and one unit from each of the J available assets. At t = 1,
there are S states of nature s = 1 . . . S with the probability of πs for state s. At
t = 1, the investor receives the payoffs of the assets. An asset j has a payoff Xj
that pays xj,s in state s.
I assume that an investor trades an amount hj of each asset j and the investor
expects a probability of success PSj for an asset j in the second time period.
Assuming narrow framing implies that the investor evaluates each asset separately.
The investor derives utility from the consumption in the two time periods and
additionally he derives a possible utility gain of λ ≥ 0 from achieving the aspiration
level. In this model, there is no aspiration level for consumption but only for each
stock. Thus, the problem of maximizing the investors’ utility is continuous in
consumption. It is also important that in this approach the probability of success
is exogenous in the model since the probability of success is based on the past
returns which is given at t = 0 in this model.
Thus, in this model the investor chooses c0, c1, and hj (j = 1 . . . J) to optimize




u(c0) + E(u(c1)) + λ
∑
j
(hj + 1)PSj λ ≥ 0









The first-order condition when the investor maximizes his utility by choosing the
optimal trading behavior is the following for each asset j:








I define an equilibrium that consists of optimal trading decisions hj by the
investor based on equation (1.2) and all markets clear, hj = 0 for all j (since there
is only one representative agent). As a result, it is an equilibrium if hj = 0 for all
j, c0 = e0, c1 =
∑










According to equation (1.5), the price of an asset is an increasing function of
the probability of success, i.e., the investors are willing to pay a higher price for an
asset with a higher probability of success when λ > 0. If λ = 0, the probability of
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success does not play a role and equation (1.5) can be simplified to the standard






To describe the relationship between the expected return of an asset j and the
probability of success, I consider the marginal effect of the probability of success




















The marginal effect of the probability of success on the expected return is
negative because the expected payoff E(Xj), the price, λ, and u′(e0) are all
positive. Thus, equation (1.6) describes my main hypothesis that there is a
negative relationship between the expected return of an asset j and its probability
of success. This relationship also holds for excess return above the risk-free rate
of an asset j since the return of the risk-free asset is unaffected by PSj (PS = 0
for the risk-free rate).
1.4 Construction of Probability of Success Measure
In this section, I state my hypothesis and I also describe and discuss the assumptions
that I use to construct the empirical measure for the probability of success.
Hypothesis: Stocks with a higher probability of success earn a lower subsequent
return. Conversely, stocks with a lower probability of success earn a higher subsequent
return.
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To test this hypothesis, I need to make several assumptions in the empirical settings
since there is no possibility to observe the characteristics of an asset from this
perspective. To define the probability of success, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Investors incorporate the probability of success of an asset into
their utility functions described in equation (1.2). I assume four different aspiration
level returns: zero return, risk-free rate, market return, and the industry average
return.
Assumption 2: Investors use the daily observations of the last month to construct
their estimated probability of success.
Assumption 3: Investors assume that each trading day occurred with the same
probability.
Assumption 1 means that investors aim to achieve the aspiration level return.
I investigate several different specifications for aspiration level return such as zero
return, risk-free return, market return (value-weighted market return), and the
industry average return (based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification3).
First, I investigate the specification when the aspiration level return is zero or
the risk-free rate because the investors might prefer to avoid negative net returns
or returns that are lower than the risk-free rate. It would imply that they only
consider an outcome to be successful if it does not underperform a strategy in which




the aspiration level return when it is the market return or the industry average
return because it is natural to expect that the investors use a benchmark return
to evaluate their decisions.
Assumption 2 means that investors use daily window length for aspiration
levels. Using the daily returns seems to be an appropriate window length because
of the easy availability of the daily returns for the investors and the daily returns
present a recent experience for the investors which might influence them more. My
second assumption also implies that the investors use past information to predict
future characteristics which is a standard assumption for being able to create an
estimate for future values. Although several characteristics of a stock are not stable
over time (e.g., Bondt & Thaler, 1985) it has been shown that investors might use
extrapolation more often than it is rational (Barberis et al., 2015).
An alternative interpretation of the assumption of using the past information to
construct the probability of success measure is that the investors try to maximize
the probability of success of their portfolio because they use it as an argument
to prove their skills and to defend against a critique of their decisions. If they
prefer stocks that achieved the aspiration level return recently then it is easier to
interpret that recent success as part of their decisions. For instance, an investor
can defend easier a choice of a stock that has performed poorly in a month if it
has a better performance based on the last two months.
Finally, following Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang (2016), assumption 3 that
each observation occurs with the same probability provides a clear approach to
calculate the probabilities based on the past information.
Based on these assumptions, I construct my measure as the percentage of the








where PSj,t is the probability of success measure for an asset j in the month t,
st = 1, . . . , St represents the trading days in month t, St is the number of trading
days in the current month t, r̄j,t is the aspiration level return for an asset j in
month t, and 1(r̄j,t,∞)(Rj,st) is an indicator function which has the value of one if
the daily return on the day s is above or equal to the aspiration level return and
zero otherwise.
1.5 The Probability of Success in the Cross-section
of Stock Returns
In this section, I describe the data and I present the empirical tests of the hypothesis
of the model with an aspiration level. Namely, I test whether stocks with a high
probability of success measure earn a lower return than the stocks with a low
probability of success measure. I also investigate the effect of choosing different
aspiration levels such as zero return, risk-free return, market return, and the
industry average return.
First, I describe the data that I use to test the hypothesis. Second, I run
univariate portfolio analyses to present the strength of the probability of success
measure. Third, I run bivariate portfolio level analyses and Fama-MacBeth regressions
to control for a set of different variables. Fourth, I present the characteristics of
portfolio quintiles based on the probability of success measure to investigate the
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similarities and differences between the probability of success measure and the
control variables. Fifth, I investigate the effect of arbitrage costs and sophistication
on my measure. Sixth, I present additional evidence that the results of the measure
is not driven by liquidity or microstucutre effect. Finally, I present additional
sensitivity analyses with different aspiration levels in Fama-MacBeth regressions
including all control variables.
1.5.1 Data
Data come from CRSP and COMPUSTAT and consists of the monthly and daily
stock prices, share volume, holding period returns, number of shares outstanding,
SIC code and value-weighted market return from CRSP and book value for total
assets from COMPUSTAT. The sample covers the period from July 1962 to December
2016 for all stocks from CRSP. Following Fama and French (1992), I measure firm
size by the market value of equity and book-to-market as the ratio of the book
and market value of equity. I calculate book-to-market using accounting data
from COMPUSTAT as of December of the previous year and exclude firms for
a given month t with negative book-to-market equity. I extend the book equity
data from Kenneth French’s website4 for those observations which are not covered
by COMPUSTAT. I exclude stock-month observations if any of the two following
requirements does not hold. First, a stock-month observation must have all control
variables available. Second, the stock must be traded on each day in the month.
My control variables for month t are calculated in the following way:
• Size: the logarithm of the number of shares outstanding in month t times
4http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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the price in month t (in million dollars).
• BTM: the logarithm of the firm’s book value divided by its market value
where these values were calculated following Fama and French (1992).
• MOM: the stock’s cumulative return from month t− 11 to the end of month
t− 1.
• REV: the stocks’ return in month t.
• ILLIQ: the Amihud (2002) measure using daily return and volume data in
month t.
• Beta: market beta based on the last month daily returns.
• IVOL: the volatility of the stocks’ daily idiosyncratic volatility in month t
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006).
• MAX: the stock’s maximum daily return in month t (Bali, Cakici, and
Whitelaw, 2011).
• MIN: the stock’s minimum daily return in month t (Bali, Cakici, andWhitelaw,
2011).
• SKEW: Skewness of the stock’s daily return in month t.
• PT: Cumulative Prospect Theory value of a stock based on the stock’s daily
returns in month t (Barberis, Mukherjee, and Wang, 2016).
I winsorize size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, short-term reversal, illiquidity,
beta, idiosyncratic volatility, skewness, and the subsequent monthly return at the
1% level in each month.
23
1.5.2 Expected Return and the Probability of Success
In this section, I use the percentage of the daily returns that achieved the aspiration
level return in the last month as the probability of success measure (PS) to test the
main prediction of the aspiration level theory. I form quintile portfolios based on
the probability of success measure in each month. To provide an equal number of
observations in each portfolio quintile, if there are many observations at the cutting
value then I assign stocks with the same values randomly5 to one of the portfolio
quintiles. However, I also present the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions
which mitigate any concern that this approach would affect my results significantly.
Univariate Portfolio Level Analyses
I form quintile portfolios in each month by sorting on the probability of success
(PS) measure. The stocks with the smallest probability of success are in portfolio
1 and the stocks with the highest probability of success are in portfolio 5. The
aspiration level theory predicts that there is a monotone decrease in the time-series
average of the subsequent monthly portfolio returns of the quintiles.
Table 1.3 reports the time-series average of the equal-weighted subsequent
excess portfolio return and the equal-weighted returns obtained from the four
factor Carhart (1997) model (market, size, book-to-market, momentum). Table
1.4 reports the time-series average of the value-weighted subsequent monthly excess
return and the value-weighted subsequent monthly excess returns obtained from
the four factor Carhart (1997) model.
5Using unequal number of observations in each quintile to avoid randomization leads to the
same conclusions.
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Table 1.3: Quintile portfolios are formed every month from July 1962 to November
2016 by sorting on the probability of success (PS) for four different specifications
when the aspiration level return (r̄) is equal to zero, the risk-free rate (rrf ),
the value-weighted market return (rm), and the industry average return (rind).
Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with smallest probability of success (PS) stocks over the
current month. The Table reports for each quintile the average subsequent monthly
excess returns of the portfolios in the case of equal-weighted (EW) portfolios and
the equal-weighted returns obtained from the four factor Carhart (1997) model
(market, size, book-to-market, momentum). “Return difference” is the average
difference in the portfolio subsequent monthly excess returns between the stocks
with the highest and lowest probability of success (the Newey-West corrected t-
statistic with 12 lags in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Excess returns 4F Alpha
Quintile r̄ = 0 r̄ = rrf r̄ = rm r̄ = rind r̄ = 0 r̄ = rrf r̄ = rm r̄ = rind
Lowest 1.05 1.27 1.15 1.38 0.47 0.67 0.56 0.74
2 0.86 0.84 0.93 0.97 0.22 0.21 0.29 0.30
3 0.79 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.06
4 0.68 0.56 0.59 0.52 −0.04 −0.14 −0.12 −0.16
Highest 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.16 −0.34 −0.34 −0.31 −0.51
Difference −0.66 −0.88 −0.76 −1.21 −0.81 −1.01 −0.87 −1.25
t-stat (−6.61) (−5.68) (−6.63) (−10.61) (−5.85) (−6.76) (−5.61) (−8.42)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 1.4: Quintile portfolios are formed every month from July 1962 to November
2016 by sorting on the probability of success (PS) for four different specifications
when the aspiration level return (r̄) is equal to zero, the risk-free rate (rrf ),
the value-weighted market return (rm), and the industry average return (rind).
Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with smallest probability of success (PS) stocks over the
current month. The Table reports for each quintile the average subsequent monthly
excess returns of the portfolios in the case of value-weighted (VW) portfolios and
the value-weighted returns obtained from the four factor Carhart (1997) model
(market, size, book-to-market, momentum). “Return difference” is the average
difference in the portfolio subsequent monthly excess returns between the stocks
with the highest and lowest probability of success (the Newey-West corrected t-
statistic with 12 lags in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Excess returns 4F Alpha
Quintile r̄ = 0 r̄ = rrf r̄ = rm r̄ = rind r̄ = 0 r̄ = rrf r̄ = rm r̄ = rind
Lowest 0.78 0.93 0.85 0.94 0.27 0.39 0.33 0.35
2 0.64 0.83 0.68 0.77 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.20
3 0.60 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.09
4 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.48 −0.10 −0.01 −0.03 −0.08
Highest 0.20 0.38 0.32 0.20 −0.41 −0.23 −0.26 −0.35
Difference −0.59 −0.55 −0.52 −0.74 −0.68 −0.61 −0.59 −0.69
t-stat (−6.02) (−4.24) (−5.24) (−7.46) (−5.77) (−5.48) (−4.56) (−5.70)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
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In line with the theoretical prediction, the lowest quintile’s average return is
higher than the highest quintile’s average return and there is a monotone decrease
in the time-series average of the subsequent excess monthly average returns from
the portfolio of stocks with the lowest probability of success to the portfolio of
stocks with the highest probability of success. The time-series average of the
equal-weighted portfolio returns of the stocks in the lowest quintile earn 1.05%
per month excess return on average, while the portfolio with the stocks in the
highest quintile earn 0.39% excess return per month on average if the aspiration
level return is equal to zero according to Table 1.3. Setting the aspiration level
return equal to the risk-free rate or the market return provides similar results, while
setting the aspiration level return equal to the industry average return increases
the average excess return for the lowest quintile and decreases the average excess
return for the highest quintile yielding an even stronger effect.
According to Table 1.3, the equal-weighted average excess return difference
per month between portfolio 5 (highest probability of success) and portfolio 1
(lowest probability of success) is −0.66% when the aspiration level return is equal
to zero. This difference is economically and statistically significant (t=−6.61)
at all conventional significance levels. This difference is even increasing for all
other specifications. However, only setting the aspiration level return equal to the
industry average provides a convincingly higher average return difference with a
much stronger t-statistic (−10.61).
These results get stronger when the equal-weighted portfolio average returns are
obtained from the four factor (market, small-minus-big, high-minus-low, momentum)
Carhart (1997) model. The average return difference for the portfolio quintiles with
the highest and lowest probability of success increases to 0.81% average excess
27
return per month when the aspiration level return is equal to zero. However, the
statistical significance does not increase with the return difference because the
Newey-West corrected t-statistic is −5.85 in this case compared to the −6.61 in
the case of average raw excess returns. Thus, controlling for the four factors does
not change the results substantially.
Table 1.4 reports the value-weighted average excess returns and the value-
weighted average returns obtained from the four factor Carhart (1997) model.
These results exhibit similar patterns to the equal-weighted portfolios. Although
there is a slightly smaller average return difference in each case for the value-
weighted portfolio average returns there are large and both economically and
statistically significant results. For instance, the average difference between the
average raw excess returns of the portfolio quintiles with the highest and lowest
probability of success is -0.59% per month with a t-statistic of −6.02 when the
aspiration level return is equal to zero. Average returns obtaining from the four
factor model do not change the results substantially in the case of value-weighted
portfolios. All average differences are highly significant with at least a t-statistic
of −4.56. Finally, the specification of setting the aspiration level return equal to
the industry average provides the largest average return difference between the
average returns of the portfolio quintiles with the highest and lowest probability
of success.
Although all specifications provide large and statistically significant average
return differences I report the results of the specification when the aspiration level
return is equal to the industry average return in the following sections. I choose to
report this specification because it provides the strongest results for both equal-
weighted and value-weighted portfolios. However, I also discuss the effect if several
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different specifications of the aspiration levels in the sensitivity analysis.
As a conclusion, univariate sorts suggest that there is a strong negative relationship
between the expected return and the probability of success measure even after
controlling for the standard risk factors. However, these results might be driven
by another characteristic of the stocks that has an already documented negative
relationship with the expected return. In the next section, I control for several
known characteristics in bivariate sorts to differentiate the probability of success
measure from them.
Bivariate Portfolio Level Analyses
In this section, I investigate the relationship between the probability of success
and the subsequent monthly average excess return after controlling for a set of
several different variables such as short-term reversal, skewness, illiquidity, size,
book-to-market, momentum, MAX effect, idiosyncratic volatility, market beta,
and PT value. To control for a variable, first I sort stocks into quintiles based on
the control variable. Then within each quintile I sort stocks into quintiles based
on the probability of success. Thus, I form five times five portfolios based on
the control variable and the probability of success. Finally, I take the average
returns across the five control variable quintiles. For brevity, Tables 1.5 and 1.6
present the results of the time-series averages of the equal-weighted and value-
weighted returns for each double sorted quintile of the probability of success. This
procedure generates high dispersion in the probability of success and low dispersion































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The average return differences for equal-weighted portfolios range from −1.14%
per month to −1.31% per month except for the short-term reversal. It means that
none of the control variables changes the average return difference substantially
compared to the result of the univariate sort but the short-term reversal. However,
the average return difference remains both economically and statistically significant
even after controlling for the short-term reversal. The average return difference is
−0.62% per month with a highly significant t-statistic of −10.03. This t-statistic
is not only highly significant but close to the t-statistics of the other bivariate sorts
return differences. It suggests that none of the used control variables can largely
reduce the magnitude of the average return or its statistical power in the bivariate
sorts for the equal-weighted average return differences.
Table 1.6 reports the value-weighted portfolio bivariate sorts providing similar
results to the equal weighted case. It reports the largest reduction in average return
difference for the short-term reversal compared to the univariate sorts. However,
it is again both economically and statistically highly significant with an average
return difference of −0.58% and the t-statistic of −6.21. After controlling for the
rest of the control variables does not change the average return difference and its
significance level extensively.
All these results are robust for controlling for the market factor or the four
factor model. Both for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, the average
return spread between the high and low probability of success quintiles are highly
significant and these average return spreads are close to the average raw excess
return differences. It suggests that these common factors have limited impact on
the results of the probability of success.
Finally, both the equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio average returns
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decrease monotonically in each case. It mitigates any concern that the results are
driven by only a few stocks concentrated in one of the extreme quintiles.
The advantage of sorting is that it does not require any assumption of the
functional form of the relationship. On the other side, one of the biggest critiques
against sorting is that the control might not be sufficient enough. Addressing this
concern, I also run cross-sectional regressions which could control for all variables
at the same time.
Firm-level Cross-sectional Regressions
I examine the cross-sectional relation between the probability of success and expected
return at the firm level using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. I present the time-
series average of the slope coefficients from the regressions of excess stock returns
on the probability of success (PS), market beta (Beta), log market capitalization
(Size), log book-to-market ratio (BTM), momentum (MOM), short-term reversal
(REV), illiquidity (Illiq), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), maximum daily return
(MAX), minimum daily return (MIN), and skewness (Skew). I normalize all
variables in each month to make the coefficients comparable. I include beta, size,
and book-to-market ratio as the standard control variables and I also include short-
term reversal and momentum to show that my measure captures something that
is different from the returns of the last few months. I also include MAX and MIN
to differentiate my measure from them (Bali et al., 2011). Furthermore, one could
argue that my measure is quite close to several already known variables such as
the idiosyncratic volatility (e.g., Ang et al, 2006) or skewness. Thus, I include
the idiosyncratic volatility and skewness of the last month daily returns as control
variables. I also include illiquidity to show that my measure remains a strong
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predictor even after controlling for it. As a result, I run cross-sectional regressions
with the following specification and nested versions thereof:
Ri,t+1 =γ0,t + γ1,tPSi,t + γ2,tBetai,t + γ3,tSizei,t + γ4,tBTMi,t
+ γ5,tMOMi,t + γ6,tREVi,t + γ7,tIlliqi,t + γ8,tIV OLi,t
+ γ9,tMAXi,t + γ10,tMINi,t + γ11,tSkewi,t + εi,t+1,
(1.8)
where Ri,t+1 is the realized excess return on stock i in month t+ 1. The predictive
cross-sectional regressions are run on the month t values of PS, Beta, logarithm
of the market value (size), logarithm of BTM, MOM, REV, Illiq, IVOL, MAX,
MIN, and Skewness. The average slopes provide standard Fama-MacBeth tests
for determining which explanatory variables, on average, have non-zero premiums.
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Table 1.7: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level cross-
sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of predictor
variables including probability of success (PS) in the current month which is
defined as the percentage of the daily returns that achieved the aspiration level
return in the current month and ten control variables. I normalize each variable
at the monthly level to make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the Table
reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients
and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12 lags (in parentheses). N
denotes the number of observations.
(1) (2) (3)






















N 653 653 653
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Table 2.6 reports the result of the Fama-MacBeth regressions. The measure
of the probability of success is priced in each regression. I run a regression when
it stands alone to show that it is a highly significant predictor of the subsequent
monthly excess return. I also run a regression in which I include the four most
typical control variables: market beta, book-to-market ratio, size, and momentum.
In this specification, my measure gets even stronger. This result is in line with
the results of the univariate sorts, where the return difference even increased after
controlling for these variables. Finally, I run a regression in which I control for
ten different measures to show that none of them makes my measure insignificant
even if I control for them at the same time.
In each case, the coefficient on my measure of probability of success is negative
which means that a higher probability of success leads to a lower expected return
as the theory predicts.
The time-series average of the coefficients of the probability of success measure
is still −0.27 even in the inclusion of all the ten control variables. It means that one
standard deviation increase in the probability of success measure yields a 0.27%
lower expected return per month in the subsequent monthly return. It means that
the probability of success measure is not only highly significant statistically with a
t-statistic of 10.41 but it also provides an economically significant predictive power
in the cross-section of stock returns.
Understanding the Characteristics of the Probability of Success
Table 1.8 reports the summary statistics for various characteristics of the stocks in
quintiles sorted on the percentage of the daily returns that achieved the aspiration
level return in the last month as a probability of success (PS) measure to provide
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an overview of the relationship between the PS measure and several important
variables. I present the average across months of the average values for my
probability of success measure (PS), market beta (Beta), logarithm of book-to-
market ratio (BTM), logarithm of market capitalization (Size), momentum (MOM)
following Jegadeesh and Lehmann (1993), short-term reversal (REV) following
Jegadeesh and Lehmann (1990), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum
daily return (MIN), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), a measure of illiquidity, and
skewness of the daily returns of the last month in each month for the stocks in
each quintile.
Table 1.8: Quintile portfolios are formed every month from July 1962 to November
2016 by sorting on the probability of success (PS) in the last month. Portfolio
1 contains the stocks with the lowest probability of success over the current
month. The Table reports for each quintile the averages of the average values
within each month of various characteristics for the stocks: probability of success
(PS), market beta (Beta), logarithm of book-to-market ratio (BTM), logarithm
of market capitalization (Size), momentum (MOM) following Jegadeesh and
Lehmann (1993), short-term reversal (REV) following Jegadeesh and Lehmann
(1990), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN),
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), a measure of illiquidity (Amihud, 2002), and
skewness of the last month’s returns. N denotes the number of observations.
PS Beta BTM Size MOM REV MAX MIN IVOL Illiq Skew
1 0.33 0.95 −0.54 19.09 0.15 −0.07 0.06 −0.06 2.58 7.92 0.31
2 0.42 0.96 −0.57 19.12 0.14 −0.02 0.07 −0.06 2.63 8.74 0.27
3 0.47 0.96 −0.59 19.19 0.14 0.01 0.07 −0.05 2.59 8.51 0.22
4 0.52 0.96 −0.63 19.29 0.15 0.05 0.06 −0.05 2.53 7.90 0.18
5 0.62 0.95 −0.70 19.47 0.17 0.11 0.06 −0.05 2.39 6.09 0.13
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
There are some interesting patterns in the characteristics of the portfolio quintiles
based on the probability of success. First of all, there is no relationship between
the probability of success and beta, size, momentum, MAX, MIN, idiosyncratic
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volatility or illiquidity. It means that none of the quintiles is concentrated among
small and illiquid stocks or stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
Second, there is a negative correlation between the logarithm of the book-to-
market ratio and the probability of success. Thus, stocks with low probability of
success tend to have a higher book-to-market ratio. This might be driven by the
fact that the prices of the stocks with a low probability of success are more likely to
fall in the past which could raise the book-to-market ratio. However, the variation
in the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio across the portfolio quintiles are quite
small (from −0.54 to −0.70).
Third, the short-term reversal has a positive correlation with the probability
of success measure. The portfolio quintile with the smallest probability of success
has an average of 7% return per month drop in the last month, while the portfolio
with the highest probability of success has an average of 11% return per month.
This correlation is intuitively based on the construction of the probability of
success measure. To differentiate the measure of the probability of success from
the short-term reversal, I present bivariate sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions
but I also perform additional tests in a following section to control for potential
microstructure effects. Finally, there is a negative correlation between the skewness
of the daily returns and the probability of success measure. It is also intuitive since
a stock with a lot of small positive returns but one large drop is more likely to
end up in the high probability of success quintile, while a stock with lot of small
negative returns with a large positive outlier return is more like to end up in the low
probability of success quintile by construction. However, skewness has the opposite
prediction compared to the probability of success. According to preference for
skewness, stocks with a positive skewness should earn a lower subsequent monthly
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average excess return on average, while the low probability of success predicts a
higher subsequent monthly average excess return on average.
Table 1.8 also provides an explanation why there was only very limited impact
of the control variables on the probability of success measure in bivariate sorts
since the values of most of the control variables are the same across the portfolio
quintiles of the probability of success. This Table also confirms that short-term
reversal is the only control variable which could have a substantial impact on the
probability of success measure.
To mitigate any concern that my measure would capture any of the effects
of the book-to-market ratio or the short-term reversal, I present the equal- and
value-weighted bivariate sorts and the firm-level regressions.
1.5.3 Robustness of the Probability of Success
In this section, I investigate the effect of arbitrage cost and sophistication on the
probability of success measure.
Arbitrage is more costly for stocks with small market capitalization, with higher
illiquidity and with higher idiosyncratic volatility (Brav, Heaton, and Li, 2010).
Thus, I use size, idiosyncratic volatility, and illiquidity to create sub-samples with
high and low arbitrage costs. I use the institutional ownership ratio to approximate
the effect of sophistication. If the probability of success is priced only because of
mispricing then the probability of success should not be priced among stocks with
low arbitrage costs. Furthermore, if the probability of success is more important
for less sophisticated retail investors then the effect of the probability of success
is supposed to disappear with higher concentration of the institutional ownership.
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Institutional ownership (IO) is calculated as the percentage of the shares held
by institutional investors lagged by one quarter based on the Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F) database.
However, I find that the probability of success is still priced among stocks with
low arbitrage cost and high institutional ownership. It suggests that the probability
of success is not a consequence of mispricing. The return spread between the
highest and lowest probability of success quintile is large and highly significant
among large and liquid stocks as well. In addition, the value-weighted portfolio
return difference is even higher and stronger for low idiosyncratic volatility stocks
than for high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. It suggests that the results of the
probability of success is not only driven by small and illiquid stocks with high
arbitrage costs. This results also mitigates the concern that the return spread
between the high and low probability of success quintiles are driven by capturing
some microstructure effects.
Increasing the institutional ownership makes the results even stronger which
indicates that the low level of sophistication does not drive the results either.
The value-weighted average portfolio return difference increases from −0.51% per
month to −0.73% per month by increasing the institutional ownership. This also
suggests that the probability of success is not a consequence of mispricing which
persists because of high arbitrage costs or low sophistication.
Table 1.9 reports the time-series averages of the subsequent monthly excess
returns for each quintile sorted based on the probability of success into two sub-
samples based on size, liquidity, and idiosyncratic volatility. In each month, I use
the median value of the control variable to split the sample into two sub-samples.
Within each sample in each month, I sort the stocks into portfolio quintiles based
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on the probability of success. Finally, I generate the average return difference
between the quintile with the highest probability of success and the quintile with
the lowest probability of success (t-statistics are in parentheses). Both the equal-
and value-weighted average return differences are highly significant for small and
large stocks and liquid and illiquid stocks. Thus, the effect of the probability of
success is significant irrespective of the sub-samples. The value-weighted portfolio
average return difference is −0.73% per month with a t-statistic of −7.71 for large
firms and −0.71% per month with a t-statistic of −7.47 for the liquid firms.
These average return differences are highly significant, both economically and
statistically.
Furthermore, the average return difference is even stronger for stocks with low
idiosyncratic volatility than for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. The value-
weighted average portfolio return difference is −0.86% per month with a t-statistic
of −8.94, while the value-weighted average portfolio return difference is −0.63%
per month with a t-statistic of −4.99. These results suggest that the average
return differences for the probability of success is not driven by stocks with high
transaction costs which would prevent the sophisticated investors from arbitrage.
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Table 1.9: Double sorted, equal- and value-weighted quintile portfolios are formed
every month from July 1962 to November 2016. In each case, I first sort the
stocks into two sub-samples based on their median size (small and large), based on
their median illiquidity measure, and based on their median idiosyncratic volatility
then within each sub-sample I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on the
probability of success over the current month so quintile 1 contains the stocks with
the lowest probability of success. “Return difference” is the average subsequent
monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1. (the Newey-West
corrected t-statistics with 12 lags are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the
number of observations.
Small Large Illiquid Liquid
Quintile EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW
Lowest 1.59 1.45 1.14 0.92 1.57 1.34 1.16 0.92
2 1.03 1.00 0.91 0.75 1.02 0.94 0.91 0.75
3 0.76 0.79 0.68 0.60 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.60
4 0.55 0.67 0.53 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.59 0.46
Highest 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.21
Difference −1.46 −1.15 −0.93 −0.73 −1.54 −1.28 −0.85 −0.71
t-stat (−11.63) (−11.34) (−9.49) (−7.71) (−11.47) (−11.24) (−8.26) (−7.47)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
High IVOL Low IVOL
Quintile EW VW EW VW
Lowest 1.33 0.81 1.51 1.07
2 0.81 0.53 1.14 0.82
3 0.57 0.50 0.88 0.69
4 0.38 0.49 0.64 0.45
Highest −0.03 0.18 0.28 0.21
Difference −1.36 −0.63 −1.23 −0.86
t-stat (−10.38) (−4.99) (−12.29) (−8.94)
N 653 653 653 653
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Table 1.10 reports the average returns for each quintile sorted based on the
probability of success for two sub-samples based on the institutional ownership. In
each month, I use the 67th percentile6 of the control variable to split the sample into
two sub-samples. Within each sample in each month, I sort the stocks into portfolio
quintiles based on the probability of success. Finally, I generate the average return
difference between the quintile with the highest probability of success and the
quintile with the lowest probability of success (t-statistics are in parentheses). The
average return differences are significant for both sub-samples. Furthermore, both
the equal-weighted and value-weighted average return differences are not smaller
for stocks with high institutional ownership but even larger. The value-weighted
average portfolio return difference is −0.73% per month with a t-statistic of −6.02
for the stocks with high institutional ownership, while the value-weighted portfolio
return difference is −0.51% per month with a t-statistic of −3.96 for the stocks
with low institutional ownership. It means that the probability of success does not
get less important for more sophisticated investors. It suggests that the probability
of success might be even more important for sophisticated investors than for retail
investors.
6I use the 67th percentile instead of the median to mitigate the problem that in the beginning
of the institutional ownership data there are only few stocks with higher ownership ratio than 0
(following Barberis et al., 2016).
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Table 1.10: Double sorted, equal- and value-weighted quintile portfolios are formed
every month from January 1980 to November 2015 because of the data availability
of the institutional ownership data. In each case, I first sort the stocks into two sub-
samples based on their one quarter lagged institutional ownership with a breaking
point at the 67th percentile then within each sub-sample I sort stocks into quintile
portfolios based on the probability of success over the current month so quintile
1 contains the stocks with the lowest probability of success. “Return difference”
is the average monthly return difference between portfolio 5 and 1. (Newey-West
corrected t-statistics with 12 lags are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the
number of observations.
Low IO High IO
Quintile EW VW EW VW
Lowest 1.21 0.82 1.50 1.17
2 0.77 0.77 1.20 0.92
3 0.60 0.69 0.96 0.92
4 0.45 0.48 0.78 0.80
Highest 0.16 0.31 0.40 0.44
Difference −1.05 −0.51 −1.10 −0.73
t-stat (−7.37) (−3.96) (−8.49) (−6.02)
N 419 419 419 419
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To investigate the effect of arbitrage costs and sophistication on the measure
of the probability of success, I also run Fama-MacBeth regressions including all
control variables that are mentioned in equation (2.7) and, additionally, the interaction
terms between the probability of success and the control variable for approximating
the arbitrage costs or the sophistication in the given specification.
Table 1.11 reports the time-series average coefficients of the probability of
success and its interaction terms with the variable for arbitrage costs or sophistication.
All variables are standardized to make the coefficients more comparable. According
to Table 1.11, increasing the size of a stock or increasing the illiquidity of a
stock yield a lower effect for the probability of success. This is in line with the
results of Table 1.9 where the measure of the probability of success generates a
significant and large average return difference in the sub-sample of small firms and
in the sub sample of illiquid stocks. However, the interaction term between the
idiosyncratic volatility and the probability of success is not significant. It means
that increasing the idiosyncratic volatility does not increase the strength of the
probability of success. The Fama-MacBeth approach evaluates each observation
equally important, which might be the reason why there is no positive sign on
the average coefficients of the interaction term between the idiosyncratic volatility
and the probability of success as Table 1.9 suggests, based on the value-weighted
portfolios. According to Table 1.9, the equal-weighted portfolios generate a larger
average return difference for high volatility stocks than for low volatility stocks
but this pattern changes for the value-weighted portfolios.
The results are very similar for the institutional ownership. The interaction
term between the institutional ownership and the probability of success is not
significant. However, the negative average coefficients indicate that increasing
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the sophistication (institutional ownership) yields an even stronger effect for the
probability of success. This pattern is even stronger in Table 1.10 for the value-
weighted portfolios.
These results suggest that there is no strong evidence that the measure of
the probability of success would be a result of mispricing. Although the size and
illiquidity seem to have an effect on the magnitude of the effect of the probability
of success idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership does not confirm this
pattern. In addition, the probability of success is highly significant among small
and illiquid stocks as well.
Finally, I investigate the effect of the sentiment index (Baker and Wurgler,
2006) on the probability of success. High sentiment index values indicate optimism
on the market and higher participation of naive investors. It would suggests that
the measure of the probability of success should generate lower average return
differences in low sentiment time periods than in high sentiment time periods
if it is driven by unsophisticated investors. For instance, Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2012) shows that anomalies that capture overpricing certain stocks is more
pronounced during high sentiment time periods. However, Table 1.12 reports that
the probability of success generates an even larger average return difference in
the low sentiment time periods. This result and the results of the tests with the
institutional ownership suggest that the measure of the probability of success is
an important aspect for all investors.
46
Table 1.11: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly return on subsets of predictor
variables including probability of success (PS) in the current month which is
defined as the percentage of the number of daily returns that achieved the industry
average and ten control variables including market beta, size, book-to-market ratio,
momentum, short-term reversal, MAX, MIN, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity,
and skewness. I also include the interaction between the probability of success and
size, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, and the institutional ownership (logarithm
of the measure plus 1 following Barberis et al. (2016)). The sample covers from
January 1980 to December 2015 in the case of the institutional ownership because
of data availability. For brevity, this Table only reports the coefficients of the
probability of success, the variables which interacts, and the interaction terms.
In each row, the Table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional
regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12
lags (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Size Illiq IVOL IO
PS −0.29 −0.29 −0.28 −0.25

















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 653 653 653 419
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Table 1.12: Double sorted, equal- and value-weighted quintile portfolios are formed
every month from July 1965 to November 2014. In each case, I first sort the stocks
into two sub-samples based on sentiment index value with a breaking point at the
50th percentile then within each sub-sample I sort stocks into quintile portfolios
based on the probability of success over the current month so quintile 1 contains the
stocks with the lowest probability of success. “Return difference” is the average
monthly return difference between portfolio 5 and 1. (Newey-West corrected t-
statistics with 12 lags are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the number of
observations.
Low sentiment High sentiment
Quintile EW VW EW VW
Lowest 1.80 1.02 1.00 0.80
2 1.37 0.87 0.59 0.62
3 1.11 0.71 0.36 0.55
4 0.81 0.52 0.19 0.34
Highest 0.40 0.25 −0.15 0.07
Difference −1.40 −0.78 −1.15 −0.73
t-stat (−8.34) (−4.59) (−7.39) (−6.62)
N 581 581 581 581
1.5.4 Alternative Explanations
In this section, I provide additional tests to show that the probability of success
measure is different from a potential microstructure effect.
First, short-term reversals are sensitive to bid-ask bounces. To investigate the
effect of the bid-ask bounces, I exclude the first day return of the subsequent
monthly return to mitigate the potential concern that the results are driven by
these bounces, similarly to Jegadeesh (1990). I find there is no substantial change
in the probability of success measure in the Fama-MacBeth regressions.
Second, short-term reversals and several other known variables related to liquidity
are the strongest in January. Thus, I additionally report the results for January
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and non-January months to explore the January-effect on the probability of success
measure.
Third, the short-term reversal can be decomposed into an inter-industry momentum
and an intra-industry reversal (Hameed and Mian, 2015). The intra-industry
reversal is quite similar to the probability of success measure in my main specification
when the aspiration level return is equal to the industry average return. Thus, I
perform additional bivariate sorts with intra-industry reversal and Fama-MacBeth
regression including the inter-industry momentum and the intra-industry reversal
instead of the short-term reversal.
Finally, I analyze the time variation of the coefficient loading on the probability
of success. According to the literature, liquidity-related strategies such as the
short-term reversals are stronger in the time of strong liquidity constraints. As a
results, the coefficient of the probability of success should vary with the market
uncertainty (using the VIX index), the month of January, and it should be stronger
in the pre-decimalization (before April 2001) time period. I find that the coefficient
of the probability of success does not depend on any of these variables, while the
intra-industry reversal does. These results also suggest that the probability of
success measure can not be explained by microstructure effects.
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Table 1.13: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly return on subsets of predictor
variables including probability of success (PS) in the current month which is
defined as the percentage of the number of daily returns that achieved the industry
average and ten control variables including market beta, size, book-to-market ratio,
momentum, short-term reversal, MAX, MIN, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity,
and skewness. These coefficients are reported in the first column. This Table in
the second column also reports the time-series average coefficients when the first
day return of the subsequent monthly return is excluded. Finally, the third and
fourth column report the time-series average coefficients for the January effect.
In each row, the Table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional
regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12
lags (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Excluding the first day January effect
No Yes January Non-January
PS −0.27 −0.27 −0.23 −0.28
(−10.75) (−10.73) (−4.06) (−11.03)
Beta 0.02 0.02 −0.00 0.02
(0.44) (0.65) −(0.03) (0.45)
Size −0.26 −0.27 −1.82 −0.12
(−4.18) (−4.15) (−5.44) (−1.99)
BTM 0.23 0.19 0.79 0.18
(4.18) (3.62) (2.91) (3.37)
MOM 0.44 0.42 −0.27 0.50
(6.84) (7.10) (−2.00) (7.52)
REV −0.34 −0.12 −1.74 −0.21
(−5.67) (−2.45) (−8.13) (−3.85)
MAX −0.12 −0.13 −0.35 −0.10
(−2.38) (−2.68) (−1.64) (−1.99)
MIN 0.07 0.07 0.71 0.02
(1.51) (1.38) (6.00) (0.32)
IVOL −0.35 −0.36 1.71 −0.54
(−3.14) (−3.52) (4.95) (−4.44)
Illiq 0.11 0.12 0.65 0.06
(3.95) (4.50) (8.68) (2.21)
Skew 0.00 −0.01 −0.07 0.01
(0.10) (−0.62) (−1.47) (0.36)
N 653 653 653 653
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Table 1.13 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the regressions
for the two tests. The first and second column reports the time-series averages
of the coefficients when the subsequent monthly excess returns include the first
day of the month return and when they exclude the first day of the month return.
The average coefficient of the short-term reversal suffers a large drop both in
its size and in its significance by excluding the first day return. This is in line
with the literature that the short-term reversal is sensitive to the bid-ask bounces
as a microstructure effect. However, the probability of success is not affected
by excluding the first day return. Both the magnitude and the significance of
the time-series average of the coefficients remain the same. It suggests that the
measure is not driven by the bid-ask bounce.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1.13 report the time-series averages
of the coefficients for January and the non-January months. There are several
variables which are sensitive to the January-effect such as the short-term reversal,
size, or book-to-market ratio. However, the probability of success is not affected
by the January-effect. It remains both economically and statistically significant.
The probability of success is even a bit stronger among the non-January months.
This also supports the hypothesis that this measure is different from the known
variables, especially from the short-term reversal.
Table 1.14 reports the equal-weighted and value-weighted time-series averages
of the subsequent excess returns of the bivariate sorts controlling for the intra-
industry reversal. In this case, I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on the
return of the current month within each industry in each month. In this approach
portfolio quintiles are generated in which the first quintile consists of the industry
losers of the last month and the fifth quintile consists of the industry winners of
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Table 1.14: Double sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios
are formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016 by sorting stocks based
on the probability of success (PS) after controlling for intra-industry reversal.
In each case, I first sort the stocks into quintiles based on the current monthly
return in each month in each industry then within each quintile I sort stocks
into quintile portfolios based on probability of success over the current month so
quintile 1 contains the stocks with the lowest probability of success across the
portfolio quintiles of the control variable. The Table reports for each quintile
the average subsequent excess monthly return of the portfolios in the case of
equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) portfolios and the equal-weighted
returns and value-weighted (VW) returns obtained from the four factor Carhart
(1997) model (market, size, book-to-market, momentum).“Return difference” is
the average monthly return difference between portfolio 5 and 1. (the Newey-
West corrected t-statistic with 12 lags are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the
number of observations.
Raw Excess Return 4F Alpha
Quintile EW VW EW VW
Lowest 0.89 0.77 0.21 0.19
2 0.85 0.72 0.18 0.18
3 0.76 0.58 0.09 0.02
4 0.72 0.52 0.04 −0.06
Highest 0.54 0.37 −0.10 −0.17
Difference −0.35 −0.40 −0.31 −0.36
t-stat (−6.06) (−6.07) (−5.83) (−5.57)
N 653 653 653 653
the last month. Then, within each portfolio quintile, I sort stocks into portfolio
quintiles based on their probability of success.
According to Table 1.14, the average return difference between the highest and
lowest quintile’s returns become smaller than in the univariate sorts. However,
with −0.35% per month for equal-weighted portfolios and −0.40% per month for
value-weighted portfolios, the results remain highly significant with a t-statistic of
−6.06 and −6.07. These results are both economically and statistically significant
and the four factor (Carhart, 1997) model provides similar results. It mitigates
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the concern that my measure would only be driven by the intra-industry reversal.
However, the probability of success measure might capture the combination
of the intra-industry reversal and some other known variables. I also perform
Fama-MacBeth regressions in which I include inter-momentum (Ind-MOM) using
the variable of the industry average return in the last month for a stock and the
intra-industry reversal (Ind-REV) using the variable of the difference between the
stock return and the industry average return. These two variables are created by
decomposing short-term reversal because they capture two significantly different
parts of the short-term reversal (Hameed and Mian, 2015).
The first column of the Table 1.15 reports the time-series averages of the
coefficients of the Fama-Macbeth regressions including inter-industry and intra-
industry decomposition of the short-term reversal. The time-series average of
the probability of success measure becomes smaller by decomposing short-term
reversal which means that intra-industry reversal can explain part of the results
of the probability of success measure. However, similarly to the results of the
bivariate sorts, the time-series average of the coefficients of PS also remains both
economically and statistically significant with a t-statistic of−7.62 after controlling
for all control variables.
In the following, I present the results of the tests to show that the probability of
success measure is not driven by a microstructure effect after controlling for intra-
industry reversal. The second column of Table 1.15 reports the time-series averages
of the coefficients of the Fama-Macbeth regressions including an inter-industry and
intra-industry decomposition of the short-term reversal when the first day return
is excluded from the subsequent monthly returns. This method controls for the
potential effect of bid-ask bounces. Intra-industry reversal suffer a large reduce
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in the magnitude of the time-series average coefficient similarly to the short-term
reversal. However, the time-series average coefficient for the probability of success
does not decrease in this case either. It suggests that short-term reversal and
intra-industry reversal variables are sensitive to the microstructure effects such as
bid-ask bounces, while the probability of success measure is insensitive to bid-ask
bounces.
The third and fourth column of Table 1.15 reports the time-series averages of
the coefficients of the Fama-Macbeth regressions including inter-industry and intra-
industry decomposition of the short-term reversal for the January months and the
non-January months. Several known variables that are related to microstructure
effects are known to be stronger for the month of January. In line with the
literature, the magnitude of the intra-industry reversal has a stronger effect in
the month of January than in the non-January months. However, the time-series
average of the probability of success is not even significant in the month of January
but it is highly significant in the non-January months with a t-statistic of −8.25.
Finally, I test whether the coefficient on the probability of success varies with
the liquidity constraints. The profitability of a strategy that are related to microstructure
effects depend on liquidity constraints. For instance, short-term reversal or intra-
industry reversal profitability is higher during high uncertainty time periods when
it is harder to fund liquidity. In addition, these factors are more profitable in
the month of January and in the pre-decimalization time (before April 2001)
(Hameed and Mian, 2015). To investigate the relationship between the probability
of success and the microstructure effects, I run a regression of the coefficient of the
probability of success from the Fama-MacBeth regressions on the VIX index as an
approximation for the market uncertainty, the January dummy, and the dummy
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variable on pre-decimalization months. Table 1.16 reports the coefficients of the
regression and their t-statistics. Table 1.16 also reports the same regressions of
the intra-industry reversal coefficient to compare the results with a factor which
is known to be related to microstucture effects (Hameed and Mian, 2015).
According to Table 1.16, none of the variables alone or together is a significant
predictor of the profitability of the probability of success measure. However, all
of these variables are a strong predictor of the profitability of the intra-industry
reversal coefficient (short-term reversal coefficients exhibit similar results). Higher
market uncertainty (higher VIX) leads to a lower coefficient (stronger reversal)
on the intra-industry reversal and both the month of January and the months in
pre-decimalization time periods provide a lower coefficient (stronger reversal).
As a conslusion, in this section I find that the probability of success measure is
independent from microstructure effects. It mitigates the concern that the results
of the probability of success could have an alternative microstructure explanation.
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Table 1.15: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly return on subsets of predictor
variables including probability of success (PS) in the current month which is
defined as the percentage of the number of daily returns that achieved the industry
average and nine control variables including market beta, size, book-to-market
ratio, momentum, MAX, MIN, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, and skewness
plus the intra-industry reversal and the inter-industry momentum instead of the
short-term reversal. These coefficients are reported in the first column. This
Table in the second column also reports the time-series average coefficients when
the first day return of the subsequent monthly return is excluded. Finally, the
third and fourth column report the time-series average coefficients for the January
effect. In each row, the Table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional
regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12
lags (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Excluding the first day January effect
No Yes January Non-January
PS −0.12 −0.12 −0.02 −0.13
(−7.62) (−8.35) (−0.51) (−8.25)
Beta 0.02 0.03 −0.01 0.03
(0.61) (0.92) (−0.06) (0.64)
Size −0.25 −0.26 −1.81 −0.11
(−4.28) (−4.69) (−5.37) (−1.99)
BTM 0.24 0.19 0.83 0.19
(4.72) (4.10) (3.19) (3.72)
MOM 0.42 0.40 −0.31 0.48
(6.74) (7.00) (−2.45) (7.47)
Ind−REV −0.56 −0.30 −1.97 −0.43
(−9.43) (−6.35) (−9.75) (−7.93)
Ind-MOM 0.31 0.30 0.08 0.33
(6.88) (6.33) (0.46) (7.60)
MAX −0.08 −0.10 −0.28 −0.06
(−1.61) (−2.09) (−1.31) (−1.26)
MIN 0.14 0.12 0.77 0.08
(2.78) (2.42) (6.58) (1.50)
IVOL −0.33 −0.34 1.72 −0.51
(−2.99) (−3.36) (5.21) (−4.37)
Illiq 0.11 0.11 0.62 0.06
(3.71) (4.28) (8.64) (1.99)
Skew 0.02 0.01 −0.04 0.03
(1.01) (0.37) (−0.81) (1.29)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5.5 Aspiration Level Sensitivity
In this section, I investigate the sensitivity of the results for different aspiration
levels. I use the zero return, the risk-free rate, the market return, and the industry
average return as a specification for an aspiration level. I run Fama-MacBeth
regressions for each specification in which I control for all alternative measures at
the same time. Table 1.17 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients on
the probability of success measure for different specifications after controlling for
a set of variables. Setting the aspiration level as zero return generates significant
results with a t-statistic of −2.96, while setting the aspiration level return to the
risk-free rate leads to an insignificant average coefficient.
Using the market return as an aspiration level return yields a significant result
with a t-statistic of −2.49. However, the strength of the result is quite similar
to the zero return aspiration level. Although the zero return and the market
return aspiration level are both significant, they are much weaker than setting
the aspiration level return to the industry average return. One standard deviation
change in the measure generates an approximately four times higher average return
difference for the aspiration level as the industry average return than for the other
two specifications. This result indicates that setting the aspiration level to zero or
to the market return generates significant results only because of partly capturing
the effect of the specification when the aspiration level return is equal to the
industry average.
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Table 1.17: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly return on subsets of predictor
variables including probability of success (PS) in the current month and ten control
variables including MAX, MIN, idiosyncratic volatility, market beta, size, book-
to-market ratio, momentum, short-term reversal, illiquidity, and skewness. For
brevity, the Table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression
slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12 lags (in
parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
r̄ = 0 r̄ = rrf r̄ = rm r̄ = rind
PS −0.07 −0.03 −0.05 −0.27
(−2.96) (−1.12) (−2.49) (−10.41)
Beta 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.36) (0.36) (0.51) (0.44)
Size −0.28 −0.26 −0.26 −0.26
(−4.45) (−4.37) (−4.21) (−4.18)
BTM 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23
(4.19) (4.14) (4.13) (4.18)
MOM 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
(6.85) (6.89) (6.88) (6.84)
REV −0.49 −0.51 −0.49 −0.34
(−8.03) (−8.14) (−7.77) (−5.67)
MAX −0.10 −0.10 −0.11 −0.12
(−1.94) (−1.81) (−2.11) (−2.38)
MIN 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
(2.20) (2.18) (2.20) (1.51)
IVOL −0.33 −0.35 −0.33 −0.35
(−2.75) (−3.09) (−2.88) (−3.14)
Illiq 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11
(3.90) (3.72) (3.70) (3.95)
Skew 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00
(1.64) (2.37) (2.29) (0.10)
N 653 653 653 653
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the implications of incorporating an aspiration level
into asset prices on the cross−section of stock returns. Aspiration level theory has
been tested in the laboratory and in economic decisions. However, it hasn’t been
applied for the cross-section of stock returns so far. Aspiration level in this paper is
defined as a target return that the investors want to achieve on each stock (narrow
framing) they invest in. In this framework, investors are willing to accept a low
expected return (higher price) for a stock if it has a high probability of success.
I provide empirical evidence for this implication. First, univariate portfolio level
analyses present convincing average return spreads between the portfolios with
the highest and lowest probability of success for both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios. This average return spread remains both economically and
statistically significant, even after for controlling for a set of variables in bivariate
portfolio analyses and Fama-MacBeth regressions.
The zero-cost long-short trading strategy based on the portfolios with high
and low probability of success remains significant among large and liquid stocks
with low idiosyncratic volatility. It suggests that the measure of the probability of
success is not only pronounced among stocks with high arbitrage costs. The impact
of the probability of success is even stronger among stocks with higher institutional
ownership as an approximation for sophistication. These results indicate that the
probability of success plays an important role in asset pricing.
Aspiration level theory might also have interesting implications for option
pricing, dynamic asset allocation, or corporate finance because of its appealing
features, clear intuitions, and strong explanatory power in decision making, and
60
in the cross-section of stock returns. Investigating these questions could be a




Prior experience and the risk-return
trade-off
2.1 Introduction
There is a well-documented negative risk-return relation in the empirical asset
pricing literature. For instance, there is a negative relation between the expected
return and the idiosyncratic volatility (Ang et al., 2006), between the expected
return and the market beta (Baker et al., 2011), and between the expected return
and the analyst forecast dispersion (Diether et al., 2002). This negative relation
is puzzling because standard asset pricing models in finance, for instance, Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) or Lintner (1965) would predict no
relation or positive relation between the idiosyncratic volatility and the expected
stock returns (Merton, 1987) and a positive relation between the market beta and
the expected stock returns. In these models, for instance, Merton (1987) assumes
risk-averse investors with a concave utility function of wealth.
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My main contribution is to present a new empirical fact that the risk-return
relation in the cross-section of stock returns depends on prior experience. Namely,
there is a negative risk-return relation among stocks owned by investors face more
prior negative experience and there is a positive or no relation among stocks owned
by investors facing more positive experience. The reason I study the risk-return
relation among stocks with different prior experience is motivated in section 2. The
basic idea is that the investors might be influenced by the gambler‘s fallacy modeled
by Rabin (2002). The model of Rabin (2002) has already provided explanations
for several phenomena and has been also tested in the finance literature (e.g., Loh
and Warachka, 2012). The crucial element of the model is that people mistakenly
believe that less frequent prior signals are more likely to occur. Thus, the model
predicts that most individuals tend to overweight the probability of a signal that
has been observed less often than its expected rate. Expecting a strong mean
reversion yielding an overweight of the probabilities of the positive outcomes for
stocks with more prior negative experience and the overweight of the probabilities
of the negative outcomes for stocks with more prior positive experience. This can
lead to both negative and positive risk-return relation that is the main interest of
my empirical tests.
The definition of prior experience is a challenge in empirical studies and there
are several possibilities for examining this for the stock returns. This paper
presents an explorative study in which I investigate several different approaches to
define prior experience such as streaks or ratio of prior signals. I also investigate
several alternative specifications of these approaches to explore the potential effects
of these different approaches and specifications.
To demonstrate how the model of Rabin (2002) building on the gamblers’
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fallacy challenges the traditional positive risk-return trade-off, consider the following
example. Assume that investors hold two assets purchased five time periods ago,
stock A and B. Now, the price of both stocks A and B are $40. The price of stock
A can go up by $1 or go down by $1 with equal chance. The price of stock B can
go up by $10 or go down by $10 with equal chance. Thus, both stocks have the
same expected payoff but stock B has higher volatility (riskier) than stock A. The
price of both stocks A and B went down four times and went up once during the
last five time periods. The investors know that the rate for a positive (up) and
negative (down) signal is 50-50%. Under the influence of the gambler’s fallacy,
they expect that the probability of a price increase is higher than the probability
of a price decrease because they predict that the future signals should balance out
the deviation from the underlying rate. Therefore, the demand for stock B for
investors influenced by the gambler’s fallacy is larger than the demand for stock
A. In equilibrium, if the demand by rational investors is not perfectly elastic, the
price of stock B could be higher than that of stock A, yielding to a lower expected
return for stock B. Thus, there is a negative risk-return relation in this scenario.
The model of Rabin and Vayanos (2010) also builds on the assumption of
the gambler’s and the hot-hand fallacies similarly to the model of Rabin (2002).
Although the model of Rabin and Vayanos (2010) has several appealing features
and can be considered as a more advanced version of the model of Rabin (2002), it
also presents several additional challenges for empirical applications. To empirically
test the model of Rabin (2002), several assumptions must be made but empirically
testing the model of Rabin and Vayanos (2010) would require even more assumptions
on the values of several additional parameters of the model (e.g., σε,ση,α,δ). Thus,
I use the model of Rabin (2002) to motivate my empirical tests in this study to
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limit the number of assumptions that are needed to be made.
Although the gambler’s fallacy based on prior experience can potentially account
for both negative and positive risk–return trade-off based on the previous logic, I
acknowledge that, in a dynamic setting, it might not lead to the same conclusion.
However, developing a formal dynamic model is beyond the scope of this study.
My focus is on showing that the risk–return trade-off depends strongly on the sign
of the prior outcomes of the stocks and that the gambler’s fallacy may play a role
in this. Thus, the sign of the risk–return trade-off should depend on stocks’ prior
performances.
To generate a measure based on the model of Rabin (2002), I need to make
several assumption on the belief formation. First, I estimate the purchase date
with a similar method to Grinblatt and Han (2005) to specify the first experience.
Second, I generate the ratio of the positive and negative experience during the
holding time period. I consider several measures motivated the model of Rabin
(2002). According to the model of Rabin (2002), the investors influenced by
the gambler’s fallacy expect a reversal and overweight the probability of the less
frequent prior experience.
Based on this new measure, I sort stocks into portfolios and within each
portfolio, I sort stocks based on the idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of risk.
Using the idiosyncratic volatility as a risk measure, I find that high risk firms earn
higher returns among firms with more prior positive experience, while I find a
significant and negative risk-return relation among firms with more prior negative
experience. For instance, the value-weighted returns of the high-risk firms are
1.95% lower per month than those of low-risk firms among firms with more prior
negative experience. On the contrary, I find that the value-weighted returns of
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high-risk firms are 0.35% higher per month than those of low-risk firms among
firms with more prior positive experience.
To investigate the robustness of this empirical evidence, I use several alternative
measures of risk beyond the idiosyncratic volatility including the CAPM beta based
on the last five years’ monthly returns, the return volatility of the last five years’
monthly returns, the cash-flow volatility following Zhang (2006), firm age, and
analyst forecast dispersion following Wang et al. (2017). All of these different
measures of risk try to capture the riskiness of a firm with different approaches
using different data. As a result, these measures of risk are probably correlated
with the perceived risk by the investors. I find that the prior experience are
important determinant of the risk-return relation for all of these risk measures.
There is a negative risk-return relation among stocks with more prior negative
experience and there is a positive risk-return relation among stocks with more
prior positive experience for all of these risk measures. In the results section, I
use the idiosyncratic volatility as the measure of risk but I also provide additional
information on the results using alternative risk measures in the section of sensitivity
analyses.
An alternative possible explanation for my finding is that the negative and
positive risk-return relation is only due to reference-dependent preferences. According
to prior research (Wang et al., 2017; Bhootra and Hur, 2015), there is a negative
risk-return relation among stocks with low capital gain overhang values and there
is a positive relation among stocks with high capital gain overhang measure. They
provide a similar static argument but using the reference-dependent preferences
known from prospect theory. Under their explanation, the key driving factor is
that investor exhibit risk-seeking behavior facing prior losses and risk-averting
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behavior facing prior gains according to prospect theory.
The conceptual framework of this study is different from the conceptual framework
of Bhootra and Hur (2015) and Wang, Yan, and Yu (2017). They test the relation
between prior gains or losses and the risk-return trade-off building on the gain-
loss asymmetry property of prospect theory, while I test the relation between the
series of prior experience and the risk-return trade-off. Naturally, there are some
similarities between the two measures since a series of prior negative (positive)
outcomes of a stock implies a higher chance for prior loss (gain) in total. However,
these two concepts are different in many cases. The average monthly R2 of the
regressions of the capital gain overhang (CGO) measure on the prior experience
measure (PE) is 0.22 and there is a 0.44 average cross-sectional monthly correlation
between the two measures. These results suggest that there is a link between the
two measures as expected but the variation of one of the variables does not explain
the variation of the other variable to a great extent. To mitigate any concern that
the two measures capture the same effect, first, I control for the capital gain
overhang measure in bivariate sorts and the results remain both economically and
statistically significant. Second, I control for the capital gain overhang measure
and its interaction term with the risk measures in Fama-MacBeth regressions. I
find that the interaction term between the prior experience and risk still predicts
future returns significantly for each risk measures. These results suggest that the
relation between the prior experience and the risk-return trade-off is not driven
by the relation between the capital gain overhang measure and the risk-return
trade-off.
In additional tests, I show that the documented effect is present in both January
and non-January months, in high and low sentiment time periods. I also show that
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the interaction between prior experience and risk remains strong predictor of future
returns even if the prior experience are calculated based on monthly observations
instead of daily observations.
Many studies provide explanations for the negative risk-return relation puzzle.
One of the explanations argue that low volatility stocks might be preferred because
of their more positively skewed return distribution (Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler,
2011; Bali et al., 2011). An alternative explanation for the negative risk-return
relation puzzle that, for instance, stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have
higher limits to arbitrage which yields that they have lower expected returns if
the dispersion of opinions on their expected returns is higher. Barberis and Xiong
(2012) even consider the case when the investors only derive utility from realizing
their gains and losses which can shed new light on why investors can prefer high
volatility stocks. However, these explanations provide a mechanism which can yield
a lower expected return for stocks with high risk but it does not make a prediction
on the cross-section of stock returns. These explanations does not predict that
the negative risk-return relation puzzle would be more pronounced among certain
stocks. By contrast, this research focuses on the risk–return trade-off in the cross
section of stock returns. Building on prospect theory, Bhootra and Hur (2015)
and Wang, Yan, and Yu (2017) provide an explanation for the negative risk-return
relation puzzle with a prediction on the cross-section of stock returns. According
to their results, the negative risk-return relation puzzle is concentrated among
stocks owned by investors facing prior losses since these investors become risk-
seeking in line with prospect theory. I contribute to these results with providing
an additional aspect that can shape the investors’ risk attitude. I test whether
the signs of prior outcomes also matter in shaping the investors’ risk attitude as
69
suggested by the model of Rabin (2002). I find that the effect of the gambler’s
fallacy can additionally increase the risk-seeking behavior yielding an additional
insight into the negative risk-return relation puzzle.
Loh and Warachka (2012) also use the model of Rabin (2002) as a motivation
to study the role of prior outcomes in asset pricing. They investigate the effect
of streaks and the ratio of the signs of prior earnings surprises using the I/B/E/S
database of analyst estimates on the returns using the CRSP database. I investigate
the effect of streaks and the ratio of the signs of prior returns using the CRSP
database on the risk-return trade-off using the same CRSP database. Although
there is some predictability in earnings surprises (e.g., Chan et al., 2007), Loh and
Warachka (2012) consider these signals to be a good proxy to test a theoretical
model on gambler’s and hot-hand fallacies. Similarly, there is some predictability
in returns in my empirical setting, I consider them to be a good proxy for random
sequences where decision-makers might be influenced by the gambler’s or hot-hand
fallacies. Loh and Warachka (2012) build on the motivation of the model of Rabin
(2002) to explain the post-earnings-announcement drift, while, in this paper, I use
the same motivation to explore and contribute to a better understanding of the
puzzling negative risk-return relationship. I also contribute to the literature by
providing a novel empirical evidence on the role of the gambler’s and hot-hand
fallacies in empirical asset pricing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
hypotheses development and construction of measures. Section 3 describes the
data and the characteristics of the prior experience measure. Section 4 discusses
the results of the empirical tests and the robustness tests. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
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2.2 Hypotheses Development and Construction of
Measures
People usually overestimate the likelihood how a sample resembles the parent
population from which it is drawn (Tverksy and Kahneman, 1971). This error
in judgments is labeled as the "law of small numbers". Consistent with the
"law of small numbers", people usually think that prior signals predict immediate
reversal by future signals. For instance, if early coin flips are disproportionately
heads, then people tend to exaggerate how likely the next flip to be tail. This
phenomenon is labeled as the gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s fallacy has been
documented in gambling or laboratory settings (e.g., Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar,
1991; Rapoport and Budescu, 1997; Terrell, 1994; Croson and Sundali, 2005;
Asparouhova, Hertzel, and Lemmon, 2009; Suetens, Galbo-Jorgensen, and Tyran,
2015), in several high-stakes field-settings (Chen, et al., 2016), and in empirical
asset pricing exploring the effect of the signs of prior earnings surprises (Loh and
Warachka, 2012). Furthermore, prior experience seem to influence people’s belief
formation on future expectations (Malmendier and Nagel, 2015).
Rabin (2002) presents the model of the "law of small numbers" assuming that
people believe that the sequences of random binary outcomes are generated from
an “urn” of size N without replacement, while they are made with replacement.
This captures belief in the "law of small numbers", since it means that the people
believe that the proportion of signals must balance out to the underlying rate.
Thus, this model yields the gambler’s fallacy. In the model of Rabin (2002), the
decision-maker also believes that the urn is renewed every K draws (K ≤ N) to
reconcile the conflict between observing a very long sequence and assuming that
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the "urn" is finite.
Assuming that there are positive and negative signals and the decision-makers
have an informative prior regarding their likelihood, the model of Rabin (2002)
implies that the probability of a positive signal is overweighted when there are
disproportionately more prior negative signals, while the probability of a negative
signal is overweighted when there are disproportionately more prior positive signals.
Overweighting the probability of the positive signal contributes to a more risk-
seeking behavior since the higher volatility leads to a higher positive deviation
from the expected outcome, while overweighting the probability of the negative
signal contributes to a more risk-averse behavior since the higher volatility leads
to a stronger negative deviation from the expected outcome. To present the earlier
example again within the framework of the model of Rabin (2002), consider again
that investors hold two assets purchased five time periods ago, stock A and B. The
price of both stocks A and B are $40 now. The price of stock A can go up by $1 or
go down by $1 with equal chance. The price of stock B can go up by $10 or go down
by $10 with equal chance. Thus, both stocks have the same expected payoff but
stock B has higher volatility (riskier) than stock A. The price of both stocks A and
B went down four times and went up once during the last five time periods. The
investors know that the probability of a positive (up) or a negative (down) signal
is 50-50% and they assume that the "urn" has 10 balls. Thus, they expect that
the probability of a price increase is higher than the probability of a price decrease
because they predict that the future signals should balance out the deviation from
the underlying rate. The distorted probability for the price increase is 80% and
the distorted probability for the price decrease is 20%. As a result, the expected
payoff of stock A is $40.6 and the expected payoff of stock B is $46. Therefore,
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the demand for stock B for investors influenced by the gambler’s fallacy is larger
than the demand for stock A. Assuming that the demand by rational investors is
not perfectly elastic, a negative risk-return relation emerges in this case.
Thus, I hypothesize that (1) there is a negative risk-return relation among
stocks with disproportionately more prior negative signals, (2) there is a positive
risk-return relation among stocks with disproportionately more prior positive signals,
and (3) the return difference between stocks with high risk and stocks with low
risk should be greater among firms with more prior positive experience than among
firms with more prior negative experience.
I need to make several assumptions on how I construct a measure based on
the model of Rabin (2002). First, I need to define the signals. Second, I need to
specify N as the size of the "urn". Third, I need to define when the first signal
arrives. Fourth, I need to specify the renewal rate of the "urn". Fifth, I need to
make an assumption on the likelihood of positive and negative signals.
In this study, I need to make several assumptions to create a measure. However,
these assumptions could be sometimes strong. To explore the effect of prior
experience and its effect on the risk-return trade-off, I explore several approaches
and alternative specifications of my measures following the model of Rabin (2002)
and the empirical study of Loh and Warachka (2012).
My first assumption is that the investors consider the sign of each daily return
of a stock as a signal. I also perform additional tests to show that using monthly
returns as signals yields the same conclusion. In this approach, the investors
care only about the sign of a return and ignore its magnitude similarly to the
study of Loh and Warachka (2012). This assumption also contains the implicit
assumption that the decision-makers mentally frame each asset as belonging to
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individual accounts ignoring possible interactions among these assets according to
the mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980,1985). Mental accounting is assumed
in many asset pricing studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Bhootra and Hur,
2015; Wang, Yan, and Yu, 2017). My second assumption is that N<∞ but larger
than any holding time period in the empirical data. Thus, there is always an
additional ball in the urn but it is still less than infinity. My third assumption is
that the investors consider the first observation after the purchase of a stock as
the first signal. My fourth assumption is that K = N . This means that there is no
renewal of the "urn" during the holding time period. To relax this assumption, I
also consider the case in which the urn is renewed in each time period with a given
probability. Finally, I assume that the investors consider the likelihood of positive
and negative signals to be the same for each stock to make them comparable.
Grinblatt and Han (2005) estimate the expected purchase price for each stock
using the turnover as a relative probability for purchasing the stocks for a price
on a given date. I also use the turnover as a relative probability for purchasing
the stocks on a given date. As a result, I can estimate the expected date when the
investors bought the stocks of a firm. Afterwards, I generate the prior experience
measure as the number of positive returns minus the number of negative returns
divided by the number of all returns since the estimated purchase date. This
measure represents the ratio of positive and negative prior experience.
According to my final assumption, the investors know the underlying rate for
the likelihood of positive and negative signals. This assumption is an important
one in the model of Rabin (2002) to predict that investors expect a reversal
as a result of the gambler’s fallacy. However, Rabin (2002) also investigates
the effect of assuming that investors do not know the underlying rate. Under
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this new assumption, the model of Rabin (2002) implies the hot-hand fallacy in
the long-term after an extremely unlikely long sequence of the same signal. In
his model, the investors expect a continuation after an extremely unlikely long
sequence of the same signals because they update mistakenly their beliefs about
the underlying rate. To investigate this implication of the model, I use streaks and
several alternative definitions of the prior experience measure similarly to Loh and
Warachka (2012). The model of Rabin (2002) implies reversal for short-term as a
result of the gambler’s fallacy but it is undermined by the hot-hand fallacy for the
long term even implying continuation in the case of unlikely long sequence of the
same signal.
In the next sections, I present the construction of the capital gain overhang
measure, the prior experience measure, the weighted prior experience measure,
the measure of streaks and trends following Loh and Warachka (2012), and the
measure of trends following Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004).
2.2.1 Measure of Capital Gain Overhang
In this section, I present the capital gain overhang (CGO) (Grinblatt and Han,
2005) measure which defines a reference point price for a stock and the change
between the reference point price and the current price. According to prior research
(Grinblatt and Han, 2005), CGO provides a measure for prior losses and gains
for each stock that the investors have to face. Assuming reference-dependent
preferences, prior loss can imply a risk-seeking behavior yielding a negative risk-
return relation among certain stocks (Bhootra and Hur, 2015; Wang, Yan, and
Yu, 2017). First of all, the CGO measure is important for my analyses because,
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similarly to the CGO measure, I also use the turnover as a relative probability
of purchasing the stocks on a given date. Second, I need to distinguish the prior
experience (PE) measure from the CGO measure since they are both based on prior
outcomes, although they capture conceptually different feature of prior outcomes.
CGO estimates the prior loss or gain for each stock that the investors have to face,
while the PE measure estimates the ratio of prior negative and positive experience
that the investors have to face.





where Pj,t is the price of an asset j on day t and RPj,t is the reference point price
for an asset j on day t. The reference point price RPj,t is calculated with the
following recursive formula:
RPj,t = Vj,t−1Pj,t−1 + (1− Vj,t−1)RPj,t−1 (2.2)
where, Vj,t−1 is the turnover of asset j on day t − 1. The reference point price
can be interpreted as the expected purchase price for an asset j assuming that the
daily turnover represents a relative probability of buying the stocks on that day.
Thus, the capital gain overhang measure (CGO) represents the percentage change
between the estimated purchase price and the current price. I use daily data to
calculate the capital gain overhang measure for each stock for each day. I update
each price and shares outstanding with dividend payments and stock splits. If
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there is no data for the volume, then I do not take that observation into account
for my measure, I use the last available price data. I use the first available price
of the stock as the first reference price and I start to calculate the reference price
formula from the second available price observation. Finally, in equation 2.1, I use
the ten trading days (two weeks) delayed price to mitigate any concern that this
measure would pick up a micro-strucutre effect. I also winsorize the measure at
the 1% level in each month.
A positive value for the capital gain overhang measure indicates that the
owners of a firm bought the firm’s stocks at a lower price than the current price.
Conversely, a negative capital gain overhang measure indicates that the owners of
a firm bought the firm’s stocks at a higher price than the current price.
2.2.2 Measure of Prior Experience
In this section, I define the measure of prior experience (PE) which estimates the
ratio of prior negative and positive experience.
I define the measure of PE as the number of trading days with positive returns
minus the number of trading days with negative returns divided by the total
number of trading days since the estimated date of the purchase. Thus, a high value
of this measure indicates that the investors face more prior positive experience than
negative during the holding time period, while a low value of this measure indicates
that the investors face more prior negative experience than positive during the
holding time period. This measure has a range between −1 and 1, PE ∈ [−1, 1].
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where sign(Rj,t−sj,t) is an indicator function with a value of 1 if the return of stock
j on day t − sj,t is positive, −1 if the return is negative, and zero if the return
equals to zero. sj,t = 0, 1, . . . , NDj,t−1 is an index running from zero to NDj,t−1
and NDj,t is the number of trading days between day t and the estimated purchase
date (RDj,t) for an asset j on day t. NDj,t and RDj,t are defined in the following
way:
NDj,t = t−RDj,t (2.4)
RDj,t = Vj,t−1(t− 1) + (1− Vj,t−1)RDj,t−1 (2.5)
where Vj,t−1 is the turnover of asset j on day t − 1. Similarly to the capital
gain overhang measure, Vj,t−1 presents a relative probability that the stocks were
purchased on that day. If there is no data, then I do not take that observation into
account for my measure. I start the recursive formula from the second available
observation for a stock taking the first observation as the reference date. I also
winsorize the PE measure at the 1% level in each month. To provide more insights
into to the PE measure, I provide summary statistics of the PE measure in a
following section.
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2.2.3 Measure of Weighted Prior experience
In this section, I relax the assumption that K = N . I assume that the "urn" is
renewed in each time period with a probability of (1 − λ). Thus, the investors
know that the process can restart with a probability of (1 − λ). In other words,
the "urn" can be renewed but the investors do not know when it happens. The
chance that the "urn" was not renewed between today and t signals ago is (λ)t.
Thus, the relative probability that the signal t periods ago still matters is (λ)t. As
a result, using these relative probabilities as weights, the weighted prior experience
(WPE) measure becomes an exponentially decaying weighted average of the prior
experience.








where sign(Rj,sj,t) is an indicator function with a value of 1 if the return of stock
j on day sj,t is positive, −1 if the return is negative, and zero if the return equals
to zero. sj,t = 0, 1, . . . , NDj,t − 1 is an index running from zero to NDj,t − 1 and
NDj,t is the number of trading days between day t and the estimated purchase
date (RDj,t) for an asset j on day t. Finally, 0 ≤ (1 − λ) ≤ 1 represents the
probability that the "urn" is renewed after one time period. In the case of λ = 1,
the formula provides the definition of PE. I also winsorize the measure at the 1%
level in each month. To explore the change in the λ weight, I investigate the effect
of several different λ specifications including λ = 0.999; 0.995; 0.99; 0.975; 0.95. In
the case of λ = 0.999, a daily signal one year ago (200 trading days ago) has
the relative weight of 0.819 compared to the most recent daily signal, while in
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the case of λ = 0.99 this weight is 0.14, and in the case of λ = 0.95 this weight
becomes 0.000 which is almost negligible. I find that the results become stronger
and stronger by decreasing the λ from 1 to 0.99.
2.2.4 Measure of Streaks and Trends
In this section, I define streaks and trends for returns following Loh and Warachka
(2012) because these measures are also motivated by the model of Rabin (2002)
even though streaks and trends are only special cases when the gambler’s fallacy
predict probability distortion. A streak is defined by returns having the same sign
in consecutive time periods. A return that equals to zero is classified as being
negative. Missing values for the return variable are considered as the end of a
streak (neither positive nor negative). The streak variable is defined as the number
of consecutive positive monthly returns if the portfolio formation monthly return
is positive and the number of consecutive negative monthly returns multiplied by
minus one if the portfolio formation monthly return is negative.
A trend is defined as the sign of the majority of prior returns. Following Loh
and Warachka (2012), I define the trendLW variable equaling 1 (-1) if a stock’s
monthly returns are positive (negative) in at least six of the one-year horizon’s 11
months and the most recent monthly return is also positive (negative). I also define
a similar trendGM variable but following Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) in which
the variable is 1 (-1) if a stock’s monthly returns are positive (negative) in at least
eight of the one-year horizon’s 11 months skipping the portfolio formation month
to eliminate a potential market micro-structure bias and otherwise 0. Although
this measure was not created to test the model of Rabin (2002), it is consistent
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with the prediction of the gambler’s fallacy implied by the model of Rabin (2002).
To construct these measures, I use monthly returns as signals for both streaks
and trends. I use monthly returns for streaks because using daily returns would
raise several concerns about capturing micro-structure effects and I use monthly
returns and the one-year window for defining trends because Grinblatt and Moskowitz
(2004) already defined a similar measure.
2.3 Data
Data comes from CRSP and COMPUSTAT and consists of the monthly stock
prices, share volume, holding period returns, number of shares outstanding, value-
weighted market return and daily holding period returns, price, share volume,
dividends, and adjusting factors for number of shares from CRSP for common
stocks (share code 10 and 11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, NYSE and book value for
total assets from COMPUSTAT. I update the book values with the information
from the website of Kenneth French for all firms. The sample covers the period
from December 1925 to December 2016 for all stocks from CRSP. Following Fama
and French (1992), I measure firm size by the market value of equity and book-to-
market as the ratio of the book and market value of equity. I calculate book-to-
market using accounting data from COMPUSTAT as of December of the previous
year and exclude firms for a given month t with negative book-to-market equity. I
extend the book equity data from Kenneth French’s website for those observations
which are not covered by COMPUSTAT. I exclude penny stocks (stocks with price
lower than $5). Although I calculate all variables from December 1925 to use all
available information to construct my measure to be as accurate as possible I
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report the results from July 1962 to make it more comparable with the literature
on the cross-section of stock returns following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011).
This approach also provides enough time periods to estimate more accurately the
variables based on past information.
My control variables for month t are calculated in the following way:
• Size: the logarithm of the number of shares outstanding in month t times
the price in month t (in million dollars).
• BTM: the logarithm of the firm’s book value divided by its market value
where these values were calculated following Fama and French (1992).
• MOM: the stock’s cumulative return from month t− 11 to the end of month
t− 1.
• REV: the stocks’ return in month t.
• ILLIQ: the Amihud (2002) measure using daily return and volume data in
month t.
• Beta: market beta based on the last month daily returns.
• IVOL: the volatility of the stocks’ daily idiosyncratic volatility in month t
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006).
• MAX: the stock’s maximum daily return in month t (Bali, Cakici, and
Whitelaw, 2011).
• MIN: the stock’s minimum daily return in month t (Bali, Cakici, andWhitelaw,
2011).
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• SKEW: Skewness of the stock’s daily return in the last month.
I winsorize size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, short-term reversal, illiquidity,
beta, idiosyncratic volatility, skewness, and the subsequent monthly return at the
1% level in each month.
2.3.1 Characteristics of Prior Experience Measure
In this section, I provide more detailed information on the characteristics of the
PE measure and its relation to other known measures. I sort stocks into portfolio
quintiles in each month and I compute the means of the characteristics in each
portfolio quintile in each month. Table 2.1 reports the time series averages of the
monthly means.
First of all, the time series average of the monthly means of the PE measure for
the portfolio quintile consisting the stocks with the lowest PE values is −0.09 and it
is 0.07 for the portfolio quintile consisting stocks with the highest PE values. The
PE measure also considers zero returns which yields that the value of −0.09 of the
PE measure indicates an approximately 25% more prior negative experience than
prior positive experience on average1, while the value of 0.07 of the PE measure
indicates a 20% more prior positive experience than prior negative experience on
average.
Second, there is a clear correlation between the PE measure and the CGO
measure. It is not surprising since the PE measure estimates the ratio of the
prior negative and positive experience and the CGO measure captures the return
change between the current and the estimated purchase price. This correlation
1These numbers are based on additional calculations when I recalculate each measure
excluding days with zero return.
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only shows that stocks with more prior negative experience have a lower return
relative to its purchase price. Although there is a clear correlation between the
PE measure and the CGO measure these two measures are different. Performing a
linear regression of the PE measure on the CGO measure in each month generates
only a 0.22 R2 on average. This suggests that the variation of the CGO measure
only explains a relatively small part of the variation of the PE measure. To
mitigate any additional concern that the PE measure only captures the effect
of the CGO measure, I perform several tests including bivariate sorts and Fama-
MacBeth regressions in the following sections. I find consistently both economically
and statistically significant results for the relationship between the PE measure
and the idiosyncratic volatility even after controlling for the CGO measure. The
negative risk-return relation remains significant for all alternative risk measures
such as the market beta based on the las five years’ monthly observations, volatility
of the last five years monthly observations, cash-flow volatility, age of the firm, and
the dispersion of the analyst forecasts.
Third, stocks with high or low PE measure values tend to be riskier. Both the
average Beta and BTM values for portfolio quintiles exhibit a U-shape indicating
that stocks in the lowest and highest portfolio quintiles tend to be riskier compared
to the other stocks. Thus, there is no clear relationship between these variables
and the PE measure.
Fourth, there is a small correlation between size and the PE measure which
probably comes from the definition since stocks with high PE values tend to
increase their price which yields higher market capitalization.
Fifth, there is a strong link between the PE measure and momentum. Stocks
with the lowest PE measure value have 1.46% momentum return, while stocks
84
with the highest PE measure values have 36.20% momentum return. It raises
a concern since one could argue that my measure captures something similar
to news underreaction, while idiosyncratic volatility might capture information
uncertainty. In this case, it would mean that I only replicate the results of
Zhang (2006). To mitigate any concern, I also control for this in a later section.
All conclusions remain the same after controlling for possible underreaction and
information uncertainty.
Sixth, there is also a clear but weaker link between the short-term reversal and
the PE measure. It is less direct how this relationship would affect my results
since the last few trading days can only have limited impact on the PE measure.
The average number of experience is at least almost two years according to the
last column of Table 2.1. However, I also perform the tests with a modified PE
measure in which I do not use the last two weeks trading days to mitigate any
concern. I find the same relations and conclusions with this measure as well2.
Seventh, according to Table 2.1, stocks with low PE values tend to have more
volatile returns in the last month since these stocks have the highest idiosyncratic
volatility, MAX returns and the absolute value of MIN returns. This is in line
with the results of Wang, Yan, and Yu (2017). They find even stronger difference
in idiosyncratic volatility between the portfolio quintiles sorted based on the CGO
measure.
Eighth, there is no clear link between the PE measure and the illiquidity
measure. The stocks with the highest PE measure values are the most liquid
but the stocks with the lowest PE measure values are not the most illiquid stocks.
Finally, Table 2.1 reports the average number of trading days since the estimated
2These results are available upon request
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date of purchase. It shows that the stocks are typically bought quite long ago on
average according to this measure. Stocks with the lowest PE measure values are
bought the most recently, approximately two years passed for these stocks since
their purchase, while stocks with high PE measure values have even longer history
with 788 trading days on average.
Table 2.1: Quintile portfolios are formed every month from July 1962 to November
2016 by sorting on the prior experience measure (PE) in the current month.
Portfolio 1 contains the stocks with the lowest PE values over the current month.
The table reports, for each quintile, the averages of the average monthly values
of various characteristics of the stocks: the prior experience (PE), the market
beta (Beta), the logarithm of book-to-market ratio (BTM), the logarithm of
market capitalization (Size), the momentum (MOM) following Jegadeesh and
Lehmann (1993), the short-term reversal (REV) following Jegadeesh and Lehmann
(1990), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN), the
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), the illiquidity (Amihud, 2002), and the estimated
number of trading days since the investors hold a given stock (ND). N denotes the
number of observations.
PE CGO Beta BTM Size MOM REV MAX MIN IVOL Illiq ND
1 -0.09 -0.29 1.07 -0.50 18.79 1.46 -0.70 6.97 -5.61 2.71 8.90 392
2 -0.03 -0.11 0.85 -0.43 18.73 11.41 1.23 5.93 -4.81 2.35 12.81 611
3 -0.00 0.02 0.77 -0.48 18.92 17.53 1.77 5.36 -4.43 2.15 13.21 767
4 0.02 0.12 0.74 -0.60 19.36 22.29 2.15 4.80 -4.05 1.93 8.71 880
5 0.07 0.19 0.88 -0.90 19.99 36.20 3.74 4.82 -4.04 1.89 3.07 788
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
2.4 Results
In this section, I present the results of the tests of my hypotheses. First, I
replicate the results of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle (Ang., et al., 2006) in
my sample. Sorting stocks based on their idiosyncratic volatility in each month
into portfolio quintiles generates a substantial and statistically significant average
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subsequent monthly return difference between the high idiosyncratic volatility and
low idiosyncratic volatility quintiles.
Second, I replicate the results of the relationship between the capital gain
overhang measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. Both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios are formed and the negative relation between the idiosyncratic
volatility and the subsequent monthly return is concentrated among stocks with
low capital gain overhang values. There are no significant results for the average
subsequent monthly return difference between quintiles with high and low idiosyncratic
volatility for stocks with high capital gain overhang values. This is in line with
previous results in the literature (Bhootra and Hur, 2015; Wang, Yan, and Yu,
2017).
Third, I present the results of my main hypothesis. I sort stocks into portfolio
quintiles based on their PE values in each month, then, within each portfolio
quintile, I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility.
Thus, I form 5 times 5 portfolios in each month. Both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolio subsequent monthly returns are formed for each portfolio in
each month. I find that there is a negative relation between the idiosyncratic
volatility and the subsequent monthly return for stocks with low PE values but
there is no such a relation among stocks with high PE values. It means that the
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is concentrated among stocks owned by investors
facing prior negative experience. To mitigate any concern that these results might
be driven by the similarity between the CGO and PE measures, I perform several
additional tests.
Fourth, I present test results on a triple sort where I sort stocks into portfolio
quintiles based on their CGO values in each month, then, within each portfolio,
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I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their PE values. I form portfolio
quintiles based on the PE quintiles across the CGO quintiles. For instance, the new
portfolio quintile with the highest PE values is formed from the portfolio quintiles
with the highest PE values within each CGO portfolio quintiles. This method
generates portfolio quintiles that have high variation in the PE measures but low
variation in the CGO measures. Finally, I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles within
this five double sorted portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility
measure. I test the average subsequent monthly return difference between the
high and low idiosyncratic volatility portfolios for the stocks with low PE values
across CGO portfolio quintiles and I also perform the same test for stocks with
high PE values across CGO portfolio quintiles.
This method shows that the variation of the PE values within each CGO
quintile is large enough to generate a negative relation between the idiosyncratic
volatility and the average subsequent monthly return among stocks with low PE
values. Thus, my measure does not simply capture something similar to the CGO
measure.
Finally, I perform several Fama-MacBeth regressions (1973) and I find that
the interaction term between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility is
positive and significant even after controlling for the interaction between the CGO
measure and the idiosyncratic volatility and several additional known factors.
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2.4.1 Idiosyncratic Volatility and the Capital Gain Overhang
Measure
First, I present the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle (Ang, etal., 2006) in Table 2.2
which reports the average subsequent monthly returns of portfolio quintiloes sorted
based on idiosyncratic volatility. Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility earn a
lower subsequent monthly return on average than stocks with low idiosyncratic
volatility. In my sample, the quintile portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic
volatility earn a value-weighted 0.57% per month return lower than the quintile
portfolio with stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. This puzzle has gained
a lot of attention and one of the potential explanations is provided by reference-
dependent preferences (Bhootra and Hur, 2015; Wang, Yan, and Yu, 2017). This
approach argues that investors exhibit risk-seeking behavior if they are in the
loss domain according to cumulative prospect theory. Bhootra and Hur (2015)
and Wang, Yan, and Yu (2017) find that idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is more
pronounced among stocks where the investors face prior loss which is in line with
the gain-loss asymmetry property of cumulative prospect theory.
Table 2.3 yields the same conclusions and similar results in my sample. First,
I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their capital gain overhang measure
in each month, then, within in each portfolio quintile, I sort stocks into portfolio
quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility. Table 2.3 presents the average
subsequent monthly returns of the double sorted portfolios. There is a -1.87%
return difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility quintiles with
a t-statistic of -9.64 for equal-weighted portfolios when the investors face prior
losses and there is a similar result for value-weighted portfolios. The Fama-French
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(1993) three factor alphas yield the same conclusions. There is a positive but
not significant return difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility
quintiles when the investors face prior gains. The value-weighted return difference
controlling for the Fama-French three factor model is 0.21% per month with a
t-statistic of 1.25.
Table 2.2: Equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios are formed every
month from July 1962 to November 2016. I sort stocks into quintiles using the
idiosyncratic volatility variable over the current month so quintile 1 contains the
stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average
subsequent monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the
corresponding Fama-French alphas are also reported. (The Newey-West corrected









3F α -0.86 -0.84
t-stat (-7.28) (-5.09)
N 653 653
2.4.2 The Effect of Prior Experience
In this section, I test my main hypotheses. I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles
based on their PE values in each month then in each PE portfolio quintile I
sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility. Table
2.4 reports the equal-weighted and value-weighted average subsequent monthly
returns for the portfolio quintiles. The equal-weighted average subsequent monthly
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Table 2.3: Double sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios
are formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016. In each case, I first
sort stocks into quintiles using the capital gain overhang variable (CGO) then
within each quintile I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on the idiosyncratic
volatility variable over the current month so quintile 1 contains the stocks with
the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average subsequent
monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the corresponding
Fama-French alphas are also reported. (The Newey-West corrected t-statistic are
reported in parentheses.) N denotes the number of observations.
EW VW
IVOL CGO1 CGO3 CGO5 CGO1 CGO3 CGO5
Lowest 0.96 0.75 0.73 0.86 0.66 0.61
2 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.57 0.68 0.61
3 0.53 0.90 1.05 0.09 0.75 0.76
4 0.19 0.86 1.15 -0.19 0.49 0.89
Highest -0.91 0.42 1.21 -1.08 1.68 0.96
Difference -1.87 -0.33 0.48 -1.95 -0.49 0.35
t-stat (-9.64) (-1.49) (2.54) (-7.32) (-1.90) (1.86)
3F α -1.93 -0.53 0.30 -2.06 -0.64 0.21
t-stat (-13.93) (-3.49) (1.74) (-9.11) (-3.41) (1.25)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
return difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks is -1.52%
per month with a t-statistic of -7.81 among the stocks owned by investors facing
more prior negative experience, while equal-weighted average subsequent monthly
return difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks is 0.14%
per month with a t-statistic of 0.61 among the stocks owned by investors facing
prior positive experience. The value-weighted average subsequent monthly return
difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks is -1.50% per
month with a t-statistic of -5.63 among the stocks owned by investors facing more
prior negative experience, while value-weighted average subsequent monthly return
difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks is 0.10% per
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month with a t-statistic of 0.40 among the stocks owned by investors facing more
prior positive experience. Thus, I find supporting evidence that prior negative
experience can increase the risk-seeking behavior yielding a lower expected return
for high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. This confirms my first hypothesis that the
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is concentrated among stocks with low PE values.
Second, there is no evidence for the second hypothesis and there is no clear
positive risk-return relation among stocks with high PE values. Third, these
results support my third hypothesis that the spread between the high and low
idiosyncratic volatility stocks increases in the PE values. The Fama-French three
factor alphas yield the same conclusions.
Table 2.4: Double sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios
are formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016. In each case, I first
sort stocks into quintiles using the prior experience measure (PE) then within
each quintile I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on the idiosyncratic
volatility variable over the current month so quintile 1 contains the stocks with
the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average subsequent
monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the corresponding
Fama-French alphas are also reported. (The Newey-West corrected t-statistic are
reported in parentheses.) N denotes the number of observations.
EW VW
IVOL PE1 PE3 PE5 Diff PE1 PE3 PE5 Diff
Lowest 0.95 0.77 0.63 0.85 0.65 0.47
2 0.94 0.98 0.76 0.57 0.70 0.59
3 0.79 0.96 0.90 0.36 0.66 0.71
4 0.35 0.96 0.93 0.10 0.69 0.78
Highest -0.57 0.38 0.78 -0.65 0.20 0.57
Difference -1.52 -0.39 0.14 1.66 -1.50 -0.45 0.10 1.61
t-stat (-7.81) (-2.42) (0.61) (9.00) (-5.63) (-2.02) (0.40) (7.69)
3F α -1.66 -0.61 -0.10 1.56 -1.69 -0.67 -0.05 1.64
t-stat (-10.93) (-5.50) (-0.55) (9.07) (-7.66) (-4.26) (-0.26) (7.51)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
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To mitigate any concern that these results are driven by the similarity between
the PE and CGO measure, I also perform bivariate sort analyses in the next
section.
2.4.3 Controlling for the Capital Gain Overhang Measure
in Bivariate Sorts
In this section, I test whether my main results remain significant after controlling
for the CGO measure in a bivariate sort. The PE measure quantifies the ratio
between the prior negative and positive experience, while the CGO quantifies
the prior loss or gain for a stock. Although these measures define two different
concepts these might coincide in the empirical data. To test it, I sort stocks into
portfolio quintiles based on their CGO values in each month, then, within each
portfolio quintile, I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their PE values.
I form portfolio quintiles based on the PE portfolio quintiles across the CGO
quintiles. For instance, the new portfolio quintile with the highest PE value is
formed from the portfolio quintiles with the highest PE values within each CGO
portfolio quintiles. It generates portfolio quintiles with high variation in PE but
low variation in CGO. In this case, the portfolio quintile with the lowest PE values
contains the stocks that have the lowest PE values in each CGO quintile. Finally,
I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic volatility within
each new portfolio quintile.
Table 2.5 reports the average monthly subsequent monthly returns for each
idiosyncratic portfolio quintile within the double sorted portfolios. There is a
0.88% average equal-weighted subsequent monthly return difference per month
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between the portfolio quintiles with the highest and the lowest idiosyncratic volatility
with a t-statistic of −4.86 among the stocks with the lowest PE values across the
CGO quintiles. This difference is even larger and stronger for the Fama-French
three factor alpha. Nevertheless, there is only a −0.26% average equal-weighted
subsequent monthly return difference per month between the portfolio quintiles
with the highest and the lowest idiosyncratic volatility with a t-statistic of −1.20
among the stocks with the highest PE values across the CGO quintiles. Thus,
even after controlling for the CGO measure, the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle
strongly appears among stocks with low PE values, while there is no significant
relation between the idiosyncratic volatility and the subsequent monthly returns
among the stocks with high PE values across the CGO quintiles. This suggests
that the relation between the PE and the idiosyncratic volatility is robust even
after controlling for the CGO measure.
I also test whether the difference between the differences is significant. The
difference between the high and low idiosyncratic volatility portfolio quintiles is
on average 0.62% higher for the low PE value stocks across the CGO quintiles
compared to the difference between the portfolio quintiles with the highest and
lowest idiosyncratic volatility for the high PE value stocks across the CGO quintiles.
This difference for the equal-weighted portfolios is significant with a t-statistic of
4.53. This difference is also large and highly significant for the value-weighted
portfolio quintiles as well reported in Table 2.5.
These highly significant results suggest that the results of the PE measure
is not driven by the similarity between the CGO measure and the PE measure.
To investigate the effect of prior experience in the presence of the capital gain
overhang measure and its interaction with idiosyncratic volatility, I also perform
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several Fama-MacBeth regressions in the next section. In these additional tests, I
also control for other known variables in the analyses.
Table 2.5: Triple sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios are
formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016. In each case, I first sort
stocks into quintiles using the CGO measure then within each quintile I sort stocks
into quintile portfolios based on the PE measure over the current month. I form
portfolio quintiles of the PE portfolio quintiles across the CGO portfolio quintiles.
Thus, the new PE portfolio quintiles with stocks with the highest PE values
consists the stocks with the highest PE values within each CGO quintiles in each
month. Finally, I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic
volatility within each double sorted portfolio quintile. So quintile 1 contains the
stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average
subsequent monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the
corresponding Fama-French alphas are also reported. This table also reports the
difference between the differences between the high and low idiosyncratic portfolio
quintiles. (The Newey-West corrected t-statistic are reported in parentheses.) N
denotes the number of observations.
EW VW
IVOL PE1 PE3 PE5 Diff PE1 PE3 PE5 Diff
Lowest 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.56
2 0.91 0.84 0.80 0.51 0.47 0.62
3 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.73 0.61 0.73
4 0.71 0.78 0.64 0.49 0.50 0.57
Highest -0.00 0.34 0.45 -0.11 0.23 0.53
Difference -0.88 -0.50 -0.26 0.62 -0.79 -0.49 -0.04 0.75
t-stat (-4.86) (-3.24) (-1.20) (4.53) (-3.25) (-2.56) (-0.16) (4.41)
3F α -1.00 -0.64 -0.43 0.57 -0.97 -0.61 -0.16 0.81
t-stat (-6.38) (-6.23) (-2.83) (4.32) (-4.73) (-3.56) (-0.81) (4.58)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
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2.4.4 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
In this section, I perform several Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions to investigate
the relationship among the PE measure, the capital gain overhang measure, and
the idiosyncratic volatility. It has been documented that there is a positive
interaction between the capital gain overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility. My
previous results suggest that there is also a positive interaction term between
the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility measure. In these tests, I show
that there is a positive and significant relationship between the PE measure and
idiosyncratic volatility as expected and this positive interaction remains significant
after controlling for the interaction between the CGO and the idiosyncratic volatility
and controlling for several other known variables.
The results of the regressions are summarized in Table 2.6. I present the
time-series average of the slope coefficients from the regressions of excess stock
returns on the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain overhang measure
(CGO), the PE measure (PE), the interaction between the capital gain overhang
and the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction between the PE
measure and the idiosyncratic measure (PE×IVOL), market beta (Beta), log
market capitalization (Size), log book-to-market ratio (BTM), momentum (MOM),
short-term reversal (REV), illiquidity (Illiq), maximum daily return in the portfolio
formation month (MAX), minimum daily return in the portfolio formation month
(MIN), and skewness (Skew) in Table 2.6. I normalize all variables in each month
to make the coefficients comparable.
As a result, I run cross-sectional regressions with the following specification
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and nested versions thereof:
Ri,t+1 = γ0,t + γ1,tIV OLi,t + γ2,tCGOi,tIV OLi,t + γ3,tPEi,tIV OLi,t+
+ γ4,tCGOi,t + γ5,tPEi,t + γ6,tBetai,t + γ7,tSizei,t + γ8,tBTMi,t
+ γ9,tMOMi,t + γ10,tREVi,t + γ11,tIlliqi,t + γ12,tIV OLi,t
+ γ13,tMAXi,t + γ14,tMINi,t + γ15,tSkewi,t + εi,t+1,
(2.7)
where Ri,t+1 is the realized excess return on stock i in month t + 1, γi,t is the
coefficient on variable i in month t and ε is the error term. The average slopes
provide standard Fama-MacBeth tests for determining which explanatory variables,
on average, have non-zero premiums. The predictive cross-sectional regressions are
run on the month t values of IVOL, CGO, PE, CGO×IVOL, PE×IVOL, Beta,
Size, BTM, MOM, REV, Illiq, MAX, MIN, and Skew.
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Table 2.6: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level cross-
sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of predictor
variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain overhang
measure (CGO), the prior experience measure(PE), the interaction between the
capital gain overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction
between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic measure (PE×IVOL), the market
beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-market ratio
(BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the illiquidity
(Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN),
and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each month to make the
coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series averages
of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected
t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IVOL -0.47 -0.38 -0.42 -0.37 -0.01
(-4.61) (-3.88) (-4.37) (-3.75) (-0.11)
CGO×IVOL 0.25 0.18 0.14
(6.43) (5.21) (4.73)
PE×IVOL 0.27 0.18 0.16
(6.85) (4.92) (4.86)
CGO 0.15 0.14 0.11
(3.35) (3.41) (3.50)




















N 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 2.6 shows five different specifications of the Fama-MacBeth regressions.
The first column presents the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. This result is similar
to the result in the univariate sorts. I also find a strong negative relationship
between the idiosyncratic volatility and the subsequent monthly return.
In the second column, I replicate the previous results in the literature between
the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. I also find that there is a
strong and positive relationship between the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic
volatility. The interaction term between the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic
volatility has a 0.25 coefficients on average with a t-statistic of 6.43.
In the third column, I provide an additional test for my main hypothesis. I
find similar results to the results of sorting in the previous sections. I find a
positive and highly significant interaction term between the PE measure and the
idiosyncratic volatility. The average coefficient of the interaction term is 0.27 which
also suggests that the effect is as high as the interaction between the CGO measure
and the idiosyncratic volatility.
In the fourth column, I replicate the test between the PE measure and the
idiosyncratic volatility with controlling for the known relationship between the
CGO measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. The average coefficients for both
interaction terms decrease but both of them remain highly significant and positive.
Both interaction terms have an average coefficient of 0.18. It suggests that there
is an overlap between the information that both measures contain but together
they explain more than only one of them. These results are in line with the results
of the bivariate sorts where the PE measure could provide significant results even
after controlling for the CGO measure.
Finally, in the fifth column, I run a test including several known variables that
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might have an impact on the results. Including these additional variables slightly
decreases the average coefficients of the interaction terms but they remain highly
significant both economically and statistically. These results provide additional
support for the relationship between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility.
This relationship is robust for these tests as well. In the next section, I perform
several additional tests to show that this relationship remains significant even
among liquid and illiquid stocks and different time periods. Finally, I also provide
evidence that this relationship remains significant even if I assume that the investors
do not use the daily returns for prior experience but the monthly returns which
might be more reasonable for most of the investors.
2.4.5 Sensitivity of the Results
In this section, I investigate the robustness of the results. First, I create sub-
samples based on liquidity to investigate whether these results are driven by
illiquid stocks. Second, I investigate the robustness of the results in the time
series. I create sub-samples based on the sentiment index (Baker and Wurgler,
2006) and the January effect. Third, I investigate the robustness of the measure
construction by changing the evaluation periods. In an alternative measure, I
use the monthly returns as an approximation of the prior negative and positive
experience instead of the daily returns. Fourth, I use the alternative measure of
weighted prior experience (WPE). Fifth, I use the alternative measures of streaks
and trends to explore the robustness of the measure.
First, Table 2.7 presents the results of the double sort in a sample consisting
of only the illiquid stocks. I create a sub-sample of stocks that are less liquid than
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the median liquidity in each month based on the Amihud (2002) measure. Then,
I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their PE values and within each
portfolio quintile I sort stocks into portfolio quintiles based on their idiosyncratic
volatility. I find the same pattern for the illiquid stocks as for the full sample.
The idiosyncratic volatility is concentrated among the stocks with low PE values,
while it is non-existing among stocks with high PE values.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the double sort in a sample consisting only the
liquid stocks. In this sub-sample, there are only stocks which are more liquid than
the median in each month. I find the same pattern again as in the full sample. The
idiosyncratic volatility is more pronounced among the stocks with low PE values,
while it is non-existing among stocks with high PE values.
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Table 2.7: Double sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios
are formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016 in a sub-sample only
consisting of stocks that are less liquid than the median illiquidity in each month.
In each case, I first sort stocks into quintiles using the prior experience measure
(PE) then within each quintile I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on the
idiosyncratic volatility variable over the current month so quintile 1 contains the
stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average
subsequent monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the
corresponding Fama-French alphas are also reported. (The Newey-West corrected
t-statistic are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the number of observations.
EW VW
IVOL PE1 PE3 PE5 PE1 PE3 PE5
Lowest 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.80 0.81
2 1.04 1.13 0.95 0.84 0.95 0.80
3 0.65 0.99 0.95 0.54 0.87 0.74
4 0.11 0.89 0.97 -0.02 0.77 0.68
Highest -0.93 0.10 0.66 -0.95 0.13 0.47
Difference -1.91 -0.85 -0.24 -1.91 -0.66 -0.34
t-stat (-9.80) (-5.34) (-1.12) (-8.05) (-3.04) (-1.63)
3F α -2.03 -0.99 -0.50 -2.00 -0.83 -0.58
t-stat (-11.63) (-7.64) (-3.07) (-9.79) (-4.62) (-3.55)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 2.8: Double sorted, equal-weighted and value-weighted quintile portfolios
are formed every month from July 1962 to November 2016 in a sub-sample only
consisting of stocks that are more liquid than the median illiquidity in each month.
In each case, I first sort stocks into quintiles using the prior experience measure
(PE) then within each quintile I sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on the
idiosyncratic volatility variable over the current month so quintile 1 contains the
stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility. “Return difference” is the average
subsequent monthly excess return difference between portfolio 5 and 1 and the
corresponding Fama-French alphas are also reported. (The Newey-West corrected
t-statistic are reported in parentheses.) N denotes the number of observations.
EW VW
IVOL PE1 PE3 PE5 PE1 PE3 PE5
Lowest 0.86 0.72 0.55 0.78 0.61 0.48
2 0.83 0.81 0.68 0.62 0.63 0.61
3 0.69 0.88 0.91 0.45 0.77 0.72
4 0.47 0.88 0.94 0.20 0.61 0.79
Highest -0.30 0.60 0.78 -0.37 0.39 0.51
Difference -1.16 -0.12 0.23 -1.15 -0.22 0.04
t-stat (-5.19) (-0.61) (0.93) (-4.31) (-1.14) (0.15)
3F α -1.31 -0.31 0.07 -1.33 -0.40 -0.09
t-stat (-7.60) (-2.54) (0.35) (-6.12) (-3.05) (-0.42)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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I also perform time-series tests to investigate the nature of the relationship
between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. Table 2.9 presents
the results of robustness in the Fama-MacBeth regressions including all control
variables.
The first and second column of Table 2.9 present the time-series average coefficients
for each variable in the month of January and for all other months, respectively.
The month of January is known to be related to micro-structure effects. The
interaction term between the PE values and the idiosyncratic volatility is positive
for both January and non-January months. In the month of January, it is even
higher, however, because of the lower sample size it is only weakly significant. This
suggests that this relationship is not driven by the January effect.
The third and fourth column of Table 2.9 present the time-series average
coefficients for high sentiment periods and low sentiment periods defined by Baker
andWurgler (2006). The interaction term between the PE values and the idiosyncratic
volatility is positive and significant for both time periods. Surprisingly, this
interaction term has a lower average coefficient for high sentiment periods than
for low sentiment periods. This suggests that this relationship is not only driven
by naive investors in the time periods of high sentiment.
The fifth column of Table 2.9 presents the time-series average coefficients when
I use an alternative measure for the PE values. One could argue that most of the
investors do not experience the effect of daily returns since they do not follow their
investments that carefully. Thus, I created the same measure based on monthly
returns. I used the estimated purchase date and I calculated the new monthly
measure based on the number of negative and positive monthly returns compared
to the number of all months since the estimated purchase date. The time-series
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average of the coefficients is a bit lower compared to the measure with daily returns,
however, it is still highly significant with a t-statistic of 3.82. This suggests that the
PE measure is not sensitive to the definition of the prior experience time periods.
Using the daily or monthly time periods yield the same conclusions.
Finally, I also control for the potential alternative explanation of my results
that my PE measure is similar to the momentum and as a result it captures
news underreaction, while the idiosyncratic volatility is similar to information
uncertainty measure. In this case, I would only replicate the findings of Zhang
(2006). To mitigate any concern related to this, the last column of Table 2.9
reports the time series average of the coefficients when I also add the interaction
term of momentum and the idiosyncratic volatility. It does not affect any of my
results.
All of these results suggest that the documented relationship between the PE
measure and the idiosyncratic volatility is not driven by a few extreme cases. It is
not driven by the January effect or high sentiment time periods. The relationship
is not sensitive to the evaluation periods of the measure. Creating the PE measure
using prior monthly returns generates similar results. Furthermore, I could exclude
a potential alternative explanation for my results that the documented relationship
would be driven by the news underreaction and information uncertainty (Zhang,
2006).
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Table 2.9: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level cross-
sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of predictor
variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain overhang
measure (CGO), the prior experience measure (PE), the interaction between the
capital gain overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction
between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic measure (PE×IVOL), the market
beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-market ratio
(BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the illiquidity
(Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN),
the skewness (Skew), and the interaction term between the momentum and the
idiosyncratic volatility (MOM×IVOL). I normalize all variables in each month to
make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series
averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West
corrected t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
January Sentiment Monthly Experience Underreaction
Yes No High Low PEMonthly
IVOL 0.90 -0.10 -0.22 0.35 -0.03 -0.00
(1.86) (-0.79) (-1.29) (1.86) (-0.24) (-0.04)
CGO×IVOL 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.14
(1.81) (4.53) (4.18) (2.85) (5.53) (4.78)
PE×IVOL 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.16
(1.81) (4.44) (2.18) (3.99) (3.82) (4.94)
CGO -0.76 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.11
(-3.72) (6.14) (4.00) (0.91) (3.80) (3.38)
PE -0.20 0.11 0.13 -0.00 0.03 0.08
(-2.51) (3.82) (3.46) (-0.02) (1.46) (3.00)
Beta -0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.14 0.03 0.02
(-0.03) (0.68) (-0.55) (1.74) (0.58) (0.62)
Size -1.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.32 -0.20 -0.20
(-3.87) (-1.92) (-1.76) (-2.80) (-3.09) (-3.34)
BTM 0.53 0.22 0.36 0.11 0.25 0.25
(2.65) (3.31) (3.69) (1.05) (3.70) (3.74)
MOM 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.40
(2.65) (5.94) (5.65) (3.31) (6.14) (6.09)
REV 1.50 -0.55 -0.62 -0.68 -0.61 -0.63
(8.80) (-10.73) (-8.62) (-7.36) (-10.89) (-11.35)
MAX 0.25 0.05 0.20 -0.13 0.01 0.07
(0.74) (0.61) (2.09) (-1.14) (0.17) (0.88)
MIN 1.37 0.35 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.44
(4.14) (5.36) (4.87) (5.15) (6.18) (6.49)
Illiq -0.48 -0.76 -0.36 -1.39 -0.69 -0.74
(-1.23) (-3.71) (-2.34) (-3.65) (-3.44) (-3.74)
Skew -0.34 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(-2.31) (-0.71) (-2.63) (-0.69) (-1.70) (-2.20)
MOM×IVOL -0.04
(-1.28)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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2.4.6 Weighted Prior Experience Measure
In this section, I investigate the effect of using the weighted prior experience
measure. In this case, I assume that there is a probability of (1 − λ) that the
"urn" is updated which means that the process restarts and outcomes before that
date are not relevant anymore. For instance, λ = 1 means that the "urn" is never
updated yielding the original prior experience measure.
To explore the change in the λ weight I run Fama-MacBeth regressions with
several different λ specifications. I use λ = 0.999; 0.995; 0.99; 0.975; 0.95 specifications.
In the case of λ = 0.999, a negative or positive experience one year ago (200 trading
days ago) has the relative weight of 0.819 compared to the most recent experience,
while in the case of λ = 0.99 this weight is 0.14, and in the case of λ = 0.95 this
weight becomes 0.000 which is almost negligible.
Table 2.10 reports the average coefficients of the Fama-Macbeth regressions
including several different specifications of the weighted PE measures. The positive
relationship between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility gets stronger
when λ is slightly lower than one. However, when λ gets lower than 0.99 the
positive relationship between the PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility starts
to diminish and there is no significant effect anymore when λ is 0.95.
2.4.7 Streak and Trend Measures
In this section, I use several alternative measures for prior experience to explore
the robustness the definition of prior experience. I use the measure of streaks
with monthly returns, I use the measure of trend of prior experience following the
consistency measure of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), and the measure of trend
107
Table 2.10: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets
of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain
overhang measure (CGO), the weighted prior experience measure (WPE) with
several different specifications of λ, the interaction between the capital gain
overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction between
the weighted PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility measure (WPE×IVOL),
the market beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-
market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the
illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return
(MIN), and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each month to make
the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series averages
of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected
t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
0.999 0.995 0.99 0.975 0.95
IVOL -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.17
(-0.08) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.54) (-1.26)
CGO×IVOL 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.18
(4.55) (4.54) (4.82) (5.65) (6.14)
WPE×IVOL 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.16 -0.01
(5.12) (6.12) (6.52) (5.38) (-0.44)
CGO 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13
(3.35) (3.24) (3.49) (3.92) (3.80)
WPE 0.10 0.13 0.12 -0.02 -0.23
(3.51) (4.73) (4.11) (-0.65) (-8.53)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 653 653 653 653 653
following Loh and Warachka (2012) with monthly returns.
Table 2.11 reports the average coefficients of the Fama-Macbeth regressions
including the measure of streak, the measure of trendLW following Loh andWarachka
(2012), and the measure of trendGM following Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004).
In each case, there is a positive interaction term between the alternative prior
experience measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. It presents that there is a
robust relation between prior experience and the risk-return trade-off.
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Table 2.11: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets
of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain
overhang measure (CGO), the alternative prior experience measure (PE) with
several different specifications including the streak measure, the TrendLW measure
following Loh and Warachka (2012), and the TrendGM measure following Grinblatt
and Moskowitz (2004), the interaction between the capital gain overhang and
the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction between the alternative
PE measure and the idiosyncratic volatility measure (PE×IVOL), the log market
capitalization (Size), the log book-to-market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM),
the short-term reversal (REV), the illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return
(MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN), and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all
variables in each month to make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table
reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients
and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the
number of observations.
Streak TrendGM TrendLW
IVOL -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.91) (-0.54) (-0.74)
CGO×IVOL 0.13 0.12 0.12
(3.50) (3.34) (3.33)
PE×IVOL 0.12 0.11 0.26
(4.32) (2.55) (5.76)
CGO 0.13 0.12 0.12
(3.50) (3.34) (3.33)
PE -0.00 0.08 0.13
(-1.44) (2.40) (3.84)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 653 653 653
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Streaks
In this section, I create several new streak measures to explore their effects on the
risk-return trade-off. Streaks have at least two advantages to examine in terms of
prior experience. First, streaks provide an intuitive and strong example by which
decision-makers are influenced according to the model of Rabin (2002). Second, it
also provides a possibility to have a clear test of the different implications of the
model of Rabin (2002) for the short-term and the long-term.
To explore the effects of different specifications of streaks, I use 18 different
streak measures to be able to explore the different effects. First, I created the
monthly return streaks and the monthly excess return (above the market) streaks.
Second, I created the quarterly return streaks and the quarterly excess return
streaks. Finally, I created the annual return streaks and the annual excess return
streaks. The firm-level regression results are reported in Table 2.12, Table 2.13,
and Table 2.14. In each table, the first and the fourth column report the time-
series averages of the coefficients when the streak measure is the signed length of
the streak, for instance, −5 means five negative consecutive returns. The second
and fifth column report the time-series averages of the coefficients when the streak
measure is 1 for positive streaks, -1 for negative streaks, and 0 for no streaks.
The third and the sixth column of these tables report the time-series averages of
the coefficients when the streak measure is 1 for positive streaks, -1 for negative
streaks, and 0 for no streaks and the long streak measure is 1 for at least four
positive consecutive returns, -1 for at least four negative consecutive returns, and
0 otherwise. In additional unreported tests, I investigate the effect of defining
long streak as at least eight consecutive returns with the same sign instead of at
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least four consecutive returns with the same sign. Both definitions yield the same
conclusions.
Table 2.12 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level
regressions including streaks based on monthly returns. In the first and the fourth
column, Table 2.12 reports the results when streak is defined as the signed length
of the streak of monthly returns and excess monthly returns. The interaction
terms between the measure of streak and the idiosyncratic volatility are positive
and statistically highly significant with a t-statistic of 4.31 and 3.77 even after
controlling for a set of characteristics of stocks and the interaction term between
the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. As reported in the second and
fifth column, these results become even stronger both economically and statistically
when the measure of streak can only have the values of 1,-1, and 0 based on the
sign of the streak. To test the different implications of the model of Rabin (2002)
for short-term and long-term, in the third and sixth column, Table 2.12 reports
the time-series averages of the coefficients when both the measure of streak with
values of 1,-1, and 0 is included and the measure of long streak with values of 1,-1,
and 0. I find that the interaction term between the measure of streak and the
idiosyncratic volatility is still positive and significant, while the interaction term
between the long streak and the idiosyncratic volatility is not significant.
Table 2.13 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level
regressions including streaks based on quarterly returns. In the first and the fourth
column, Table 2.13 reports the results when streak is defined as the signed length
of the streak of quarterly returns and excess quarterly returns. The interaction
terms between the measure of streak and the idiosyncratic volatility are positive
and statistically highly significant with a t-statistic of 4.16 and 3.25 even after
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controlling for a set of characteristics of stocks and the interaction term between
the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic volatility. Similarly to the results of
the monthly streaks, these results become even stronger both economically and
statistically when the measure of streak can only have the values of 1,-1, and 0
based on the sign of the streak, as reported in the second and fifth column in Table
2.13. To test the different implications of the model of Rabin (2002) for short-term
and long-term, in the third and sixth column, Table 2.13 reports the time-series
averages of the coefficients when both the measure of streak with values of 1,-1,
and 0 is included and the measure of long streak with values of 1,-1, and 0. In
this case, I find different results compared to the monthly returns. I find that the
interaction term between the measure of streak and the idiosyncratic volatility is
still positive and significant, while the interaction term between the long streak
and the idiosyncratic volatility is negative in both cases and it is even significant
for excess quarterly returns. These results are in line with the prediction of the
model of Rabin (2002). Investors seem to exhibit the gambler’s fallacy for short
streaks, while, after experiencing an extremely long streak, the hot-hand fallacy
undermines the effect of the gambler’s fallacy.
To investigate the effect of a longer time horizon and different lengths of the
streaks, I also define streaks based on annual returns. Table 2.14 reports the time-
series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level regressions including streaks
based on annual returns. In the first and the fourth column, Table 2.14 reports the
results when streak is defined as the signed length of the streak of annual returns
and excess annual returns. The interaction terms between the measure of streak
and the idiosyncratic volatility are negative and statistically highly significant with
a t-statistic of −3.29 and −4.09 even after controlling for a set of characteristics of
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stocks and the interaction term between the CGO measure and the idiosyncratic
volatility. As reported in the second and fifth column, these results do not change
substantially when the measure of streak can only have the values of 1,-1, and
0 based on the sign of the streak. These results are different from the previous
results. It suggests that using longer time horizon yields results that are more in
line with the hot-hand fallacy. To test the different implications of the model of
Rabin (2002) for short-term and long-term, in the third and sixth column, Table
2.14 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients when both the measure of
streak with values of 1,-1, and 0 is included and the measure of long streak with
values of 1,-1, and 0. I find that the interaction term between the measure of
streak and the idiosyncratic volatility is still negative and significant, while the
interaction term between the long streak and the idiosyncratic volatility is not
significant.
These results suggest that the time horizon influences the results the most.
Investors seem to exhibit the gambler’s fallacy for short-term such as monthly
streaks and short streaks of quarterly returns, while they seem to follow the hot-
hand fallacy for long quarterly streaks and for annual streaks. This is in line with
the concept that investors think that they know the underlying rate for short-
term, thus, they expect a reversal as a consequence of the gambler’s fallacy, while
the investors do not know the underlying rate for long-term, thus, they expect
continuation.
These results also suggest that approximately one year or less can be considered
as short-term and longer time horizon can be considered as long-term. This is
consistent with the literature and it seems that prior experience measure has a
link with momentum (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). To control for the effect
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of momentum on these results, I perform several additional tests in a following
section.
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Table 2.12: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level cross-
sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of predictor
variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain overhang
measure (CGO), the Streak measure (Streak) with several specifications (1), (4)
signed length of the streak, (2),(3),(4),(6) sign of the streak (-1,1,0), and (3),(6)
long streak (Long Streak) with the values -1,0,1 if there is at least four consecutive
returns with the same sign, the interaction between the capital gain overhang
and the idiosyncratic volatility (CGO×IVOL), the interaction between the Streak
measure and the idiosyncratic measure (Streak×IVOL), and the control variables
I normalize all variables in each month to make the coefficients comparable. In
each row, the table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression
slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected t-statistics (in parentheses). N
denotes the number of observations.
Streaks Based on Monthly (Raw or Excess) Returns
Raw Returns Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IVOL -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
(-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.67) (-0.67)
CGO×IVOL 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
(5.85) (3.70) (3.52) (5.93) (6.00) (6.04)
Streak×IVOL 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.10
(4.31) (5.33) (4.81) (3.77) (4.34) (3.84)
Long Streak×IVOL 0.07 0.01
(1.54) (0.19)
CGO 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08
(2.09) (0.96) (1.11) (2.11) (2.16) (2.26)
Streak -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.15
(-3.47) (0.62) (1.16) (-5.21) (-4.75) (-3.97)
Long Streak -0.09 -0.08
(-1.86) (-1.85)
Beta 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.51) (-0.14) (-0.20) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43)
Size -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
(-3.31) (-3.66) (-3.63) (-3.33) (-3.30) (-3.26)
BTM 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.21
(3.69) (3.26) (3.27) (3.66) (3.69) (3.70)
MOM 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.39
(6.28) (6.60) (6.67) (6.34) (6.37) (6.35)
REV -0.45 -0.54 -0.55 -0.43 -0.44 -0.44
(-9.99) (-9.90) (-9.85) (-9.91) (-10.35) (-10.34)
MAX -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(-0.00) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.06) (0.05) (-0.00)
MIN 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.20
(5.06) (1.98) (1.89) (4.85) (5.02) (4.98)
Illiq -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-2.14) (-2.26) (-2.24) (-2.21) (-2.24) (-2.17)
Skew -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.70) (0.23) (0.21) (-0.68) (-0.84) (-0.81)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 2.13: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets
of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain
overhang measure (CGO), the Streak measure (Streak) with several specifications
(1), (4) signed length of the streak, (2),(3),(4),(6) sign of the streak (-1,1,0), and
(3),(6) long streak (Long Streak) with the values -1,0,1 if there is at least four
consecutive returns with the same sign, the interaction between the capital gain
overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility (CGO×IVOL), the interaction between
the Streak measure and the idiosyncratic measure (Streak×IVOL), the market
beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-market ratio
(BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the illiquidity
(Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN),
and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each month to make the
coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series averages
of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected
t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Streaks Based on Quarterly (Raw or Excess) Returns
Raw Returns Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IVOL -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
(-0.37) (-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.50) (-0.58) (-0.55)
CGO×IVOL 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
(5.88) (5.73) (5.76) (5.80) (5.89) (6.00)
Streak×IVOL 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.12
(4.16) (4.65) (4.27) (3.25) (3.78) (4.30)
Long Streak×IVOL -0.02 -0.12
(-0.57) (-3.10)
CGO 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(1.91) (1.82) (1.87) (1.98) (1.92) (1.95)
Streak 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04
(1.39) (1.84) (1.75) (0.33) (0.99) (1.15)
Long Streak -0.03 -0.05
(-0.69) (-1.24)
Beta 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.53) (0.55) (0.56) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49)
Size -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
(-3.39) (-3.41) (-3.43) (-3.36) (-3.38) (-3.41)
BTM 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21
(3.71) (3.69) (3.69) (3.72) (3.74) (3.74)
MOM 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
(5.95) (5.80) (5.82) (6.03) (5.91) (5.98)
REV -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49
(-10.55) (-10.59) (-10.62) (-10.50) (-10.57) (-10.60)
MAX 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.89) (0.99) (0.90) (0.90) (1.18) (1.05)
MIN 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
(5.92) (5.85) (5.89) (5.87) (5.93) (6.03)
Illiq -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-2.24) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.17) (-2.15) (-2.16)
Skew -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-2.32) (-2.33) (-2.32) (-2.26) (-2.44) (-2.38)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 2.14: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets
of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain
overhang measure (CGO), the Streak measure (Streak) with several specifications
(1), (4) signed length of the streak, (2),(3),(4),(6) sign of the streak (-1,1,0), and
(3),(6) long streak (Long Streak) with the values -1,0,1 if there is at least four
consecutive returns with the same sign, the interaction between the capital gain
overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility (CGO×IVOL), the interaction between
the Streak measure and the idiosyncratic measure (Streak×IVOL), the market
beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-market ratio
(BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the illiquidity
(Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return (MIN),
and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each month to make the
coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series averages
of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected
t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Streaks Based on Annual (Raw or Excess) Returns
Raw Returns Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IVOL -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-0.62) (-0.41) (-0.47) (-0.64) (-0.73) (-0.74)
CGO×IVOL 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
(7.21) (7.26) (7.46) (7.24) (7.32) (7.47)
Streak×IVOL -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08
(-3.29) (-3.26) (-2.92) (-4.09) (-3.76) (-2.93)
Long Streak×IVOL -0.00 0.09
(-0.08) (-1.92)
CGO 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(1.98) (2.09) (2.06) (2.06) (2.05) (2.10)
Streak -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(-0.56) (-0.51) (-0.73) (-1.51) (-1.25) (-1.06)
Long Streak 0.02 -0.05
(0.30) (-1.12)
Beta 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.61) (0.58) (0.59) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47)
Size -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20
(-3.50) (-3.53) (-3.57) (-3.49) (-3.49) (-3.48)
BTM 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19
(3.56) (3.55) (3.56) (3.44) (3.42) (3.41)
MOM 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
(6.20) (6.16) (6.18) (6.31) (6.18) (6.18)
REV -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49
(-10.48) (-10.50) (-10.55) (-10.57) (-10.58) (-10.59)
MAX 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.53) (0.50) (0.46) (0.70) (0.64) (0.53)
MIN 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
(5.78) (5.73) (5.73) (5.88) (5.73) (5.63)
Illiq -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-2.23) (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.29) (-2.32) (-2.32)
Skew -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(-1.81) (-1.81) (-1.72) (-2.00) (-1.97) (-1.85)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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2.4.8 Alternative Starting Point for Prior Experience Measures
In this section, I investigate the effect of choosing different starting points of the
prior experience measure. I consider the observation one year ago, five years ago,
and the first appears in the database as a starting point. I also consider both daily
and monthly returns to explore the robustness of the results.
Table 2.15 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level
regressions where the prior experience measure has six different specifications.
First, the first and fourth column of the table report the time-series averages of
the coefficients when the first signal considered is the observation one year ago.
This measure provides a possibility to test the short-term horizon since the last
one year is usually considered to be a short-term similarly to the momentum effect.
Using the last one year observations also makes this measure more comparable to
momentum. If the results are driven by the momentum effect, then this measure is
supposed to be to the closest to momentum. Second, the second and fifth column
of the table report the time-series averages of the coefficients when the first signal is
considered to be the observation five years ago. This measure provides a possibility
to explore a potential long-term effect since five year horizon is usually considered
to be long-term. Finally, the third and sixth column of the table report the time-
series averages of the coefficients when the first signal is considered to be the
first observation available in the database. This measure can be interpreted as an
extremely long-term effect.
I find that the interaction terms between any of the prior experience measures
based on daily returns and the idiosyncratic volatility are positive and significant.
The predictive power of the interaction term gets weaker as the time-horizon gets
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longer but they are all significant. I find, similarly, positive interaction terms when
the measures are based on monthly returns, however, it is only significant for the
measure which is based on the last one year monthly observations.
These results suggest that investors exhibit the gambler’s fallacy when the ratio
of the prior experience is considered. Although the results are getting weaker for
long time horizons, I find no clear evidence for a long-term effect. The absence of
empirical support for the long-term effect might be the result of the specification of
this measure. Perhaps, the ratio of the daily or monthly returns can not capture
the extreme cases when the investors update their beliefs about the underlying
rate.
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Table 2.15: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level cross-
sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of predictor
variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital gain overhang
measure (CGO), the prior experience measure (PE), the interaction between the
capital gain overhang and the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction
between the Streak measure and the idiosyncratic measure (PE×IVOL), the
market beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the log book-to-
market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal (REV), the
illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum daily return
(MIN), and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each month to make
the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the time-series averages
of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their Newey-West corrected
t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of observations.
Daily Monthly
1 year 5 year All 1 year 5 year All
IVOL 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (-0.59) (-0.26) (0.08) (-0.52)
CGO×IVOL 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
(4.68) (4.78) (5.64) (5.17) (5.61) (6.05)
PE×IVOL 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.03
(7.04) (3.82) (2.62) (6.01) (0.68) (1.68)
CGO 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08
(1.78) (1.98) (2.54) (1.87) (1.70) (2.41)
PE 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.03
(5.25) (-0.20) (-0.95) (3.47) (-0.88) (-1.42)
Beta 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.67) (0.55) (0.28) (0.58) (0.72) (0.46)
Size -0.21 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 -0.18
(-3.71) (-3.26) (-3.40) (-3.47) (-3.19) (-3.37)
BTM 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.21
(3.66) (3.65) (3.74) (3.70) (3.51) (3.65)
MOM 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.37
(4.78) (4.90) (6.10) (5.53) (4.88) (6.12)
REV -0.53 -0.50 -0.50 -0.51 -0.50 -0.49
(-11.24) (-11.98) (-10.63) (-10.92) (-11.90) (-10.52)
MAX 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04
(1.39) (1.46) (1.70) (0.63) (0.88) (1.02)
MIN 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.24
(6.32) (6.25) (6.37) (5.83) (6.01) (5.96)
Illiq -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-3.06) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.14) (-2.29) (-2.31)
Skew -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04) -0.05
(-1.89) (-2.35) (-2.93) (-2.02) (-1.93) (-2.32)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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2.4.9 Alternative Risk Measures
In this section, I perform Fama-MacBeth regressions using alternative risk measures
instead of the idiosyncratic volatility to mitigate any concern about idiosyncratic
volatility as a measure of risk. I use five alternative measures for risk.
First, I use market beta based on monthly observations of the last five years.
This measure also mitigates the concern that the results are driven by the returns
of the last month.
Second, I use the volatility of the last five years’ monthly return.
Third, I use the cash-flow volatility as an alternative risk measure. This
measure mitigates any concern that the negative risk-return relation only hold
for risk measures based on past returns.
Fourth, I use the age of the firm as an alternative risk measure.
Finally, I use the dispersion of the analyst forecasts as an alternative risk
measure. This measure mitigates any concern that these results only hold for
observed past information since this measure captures risk based on the dispersion
of beliefs.
Table 2.16 reports the time series average of the coefficients for each regressions.
The interaction terms between the prior experience measure and the risk measure
are always significant and positive yielding that the results are robust independently
from which risk measure I use. These relations gets even stronger by using the
weighted PE measure with the specification of λ = 0.99.
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Table 2.16: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-level
cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on subsets of
predictor variables including several risk measure (IVOL, Beta, RetVol, CFVol,
Age, and Dispersion), the capital gain overhang measure (CGO), the PE measure
(PE), the interaction between the capital gain overhang and the risk measure
(CGO×Risk), the interaction between the PE measure and the risk measure
(PE×Risk), the market beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the
log book-to-market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal
(REV), the illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum
daily return (MIN), and the skewness (Skew. I normalize all variables in each
month to make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the
time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their
Newey-West corrected t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of
observations.
IVOL Beta RetVol CFVol Age Disp
CGO×Risk 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.03
(4.49) (1.68) (2.20) (0.74) (4.81) (-0.79)
PE×Risk 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.08
(4.89) (2.00) (3.41) (4.28) (2.21) (2.07)
CGO 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.08
(3.36) (4.24) (3.33) (3.70) (4.25) (1.41)
PE 0.07 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.04
(2.40) (0.88) (-0.14) (-0.18) (0.63) (-1.05)
Risk -0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.23
(-0.40) (1.40) (0.14) (-1.64) (-0.22) (-4.89)
Size -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.24 -0.23 -0.21
(-3.74) (-4.17) (-3.90) (-3.97) (-4.03) (-2.07)
BTM 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.26
(3.52) (4.22) (3.81) (3.67) (3.74) (2.12)
MOM 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.33
(5.76) (5.18) (4.73) (5.28) (5.49) (2.60)
REV -0.61 -0.69 -0.68 -0.60 -0.59 -0.45
(-11.10) (-11.85) (-12.29) (-10.41) (-10.22) (-4.15)
MAX 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.35
(1.90) (0.70) (1.06) (0.53) (-0.89) (1.41)
MIN 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.36
(6.02) (7.72) (7.66) (6.23) (6.97) (2.13)
Illiq -0.75 -0.71 -0.78 -1.02 -0.78 -20.25
(-3.52) (-3.80) (-3.91) (-3.77) (-3.65) (-1.52)
Skew -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 00.04
(-2.01) (-1.54) (-1.48) (-1.07) (-1.18) (-0.50)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653
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2.4.10 Control for Momentum
In this section, I investigate the role of momentum in the results. High (low)
momentum value indicates that the overall return in the last one year is high (low)
which increases the probability to have a streak of positive (negative) returns or
to have a high number of positive (negative) returns in the past. Although there
could be such a link between the momentum and the prior experience measure, it
is not necessarily true that the results are driven by the momentum effect instead
of the prior experience measure. For instance, there could be a high momentum
with having a high return in the last one year, while this high return comes from
only few high positive days or months and during the rest of the days there could
be small negative returns.
The times-series averages of the monthly correlation between the momentum
and the prior experience measures are relatively high in certain cases which could
raise a serious concern. There is a 0.51 time-series average monthly correlation
between the momentum and the prior experience measure based on the last one
year’s daily return and it is 0.59 based on the monthly returns. This is not
surprisingly high since these prior experience measures were created to make
prior experience measure more similarly to the momentum. There are a 0.31 and
0.35 time-series average monthly correlation between the momentum and prior
experience measure based on the daily and monthly returns since the estimated
purchase price. These values are substantially smaller but they could be still
concerning. The rest of the prior experience measures based on the last five years
or all available observations are less correlated with the momentum effect (in each
case, it is positive but smaller than 0.14).
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Similarly, there are substantial 0.48 and 0.52 time-series average monthly correlations
between the momentum effect and the streaks based on the quarterly returns.
However, there are only weak correlations ranging between 0.18 and 0.28 between
the momentum effect and the rest of the streak measures.
To explore the role of momentum and its relation with prior experience measures
and streaks, I perform several additional tests in which I control for the effect of
momentum. Specifically, I regress a given prior experience measure on momentum
and a constant in each month and I take the residuals as a new measure. Thus,
these new measures are orthogonal to momentum. If the predictive power of the
prior experience measures disappears, then it is probable that the results were only
driven by the momentum effect. However, if these results remain substantial and
both statistically and economically significant, then the predictive power of the
prior experience measures seems to be independent from the momentum effect.
Table 2.17 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level
regressions in which the residuals of the prior experience measures are included
after regressing a given prior experience measure on the momentum effect and a
constant in each month. Using the residuals do not have any impact on any of
the previous results. I find positive and significant interaction terms between the
prior experience measure residuals and the idiosyncratic volatility for all measures
based on daily returns and I find positive and significant interaction term for the
prior experience measures based on the monthly returns when it is based on the
last one year and on the observations since the estimated purchase date.
Residuals of the prior experience measure based on the last one year provide
even a slightly stronger predictive power than the original prior experience measure.
This suggests that momentum does not have any impact on these results. None
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of the other prior experience measures yields different conclusion either after
controlling for the momentum effect which also suggests that momentum has no
significant role in explaining any of the previous results.
One might consider that streaks are more related to the momentum effect and
the streak measures based on the quarterly returns have strong correlation with
the momentum effect as well. To explore the role of the momentum effect in those
results, I also perform several additional firm-level regressions to control for the
effect of momentum. Specifically, I regress, again, a given streak measure based
on quarterly returns on momentum and a constant in each month and I take the
residuals as a new measure.
Table 2.18 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients of the firm-level
regressions in which the residuals of the streaks based on quarterly returns are
included after regressing streaks based on quarterly returns on the momentum
effect and a constant in each month. Using the residuals do not have any impact
on any of my previous results. Similarly to the prior experience measure, I find
an even slightly stronger predictive power. It suggests that the predictive power
of streak measures are also independent from the momentum effect.
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Table 2.17: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-
level cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on
subsets of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital
gain overhang measure (CGO), the residuals of prior experience measure (PE)
orthogonal to momentum, the interaction between the capital gain overhang and
the idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction between the residuals
of prior experience measure (PE) orthogonal to momentum and the idiosyncratic
measure (PE×IVOL), the market beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size),
the log book-to-market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term
reversal (REV), the illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the
minimum daily return (MIN), and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables
in each month to make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports
the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their




1 year 5 year All Purchase 1 year 5 year All Purchase
IVOL 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.15) (0.03) (-0.60) (-0.29) (-0.19) (0.09) (-0.51) (-0.45)
CGO×IVOL 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10
(6.33) (4.92) (5.71) (5.36) (6.14) (5.60) (6.10) (5.96)
PE×IVOL 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.07
(7.90) (3.82) (2.52) (4.91) (7.16) (0.75) (1.61) (4.33)
CGO 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07
(1.50) (2.25) (2.53) (1.95) (1.63) (2.05) (2.39) (2.06)
PE 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00
(4.91) (0.01) (-0.96) (1.08) (3.22) (-0.80) (-1.41) (-0.21)
Beta 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.62) (0.59) (0.30) (0.55) (0.52) (0.76) (0.47) (0.45)
Size -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19
(-3.67) (-3.29) (-3.41) (-3.63) (-3.42) (-3.23) (-3.39) (-3.36)
BTM 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21
(3.69) (3.64) (3.75) (3.70) (3.73) (3.51) (3.65) (3.73)
MOM 0.40 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.38
(6.54) (5.08) (6.27) (6.35) (6.40) (4.94) (6.19) (6.24)
REV -0.53 -0.53 -0.50 -0.51 -0.51 -0.53 -0.49 -0.49
(-11.26) (-11.96) (-10.63) (-11.29) (-10.93) (-11.87) (-10.53) (-10.80)
MAX 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
(1.37) (1.26) (1.62) (1.32) (0.46) (0.73) (1.00) (0.56)
MIN 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22
(6.43) (6.13) (6.39) (6.21) (5.71) (5.93) (6.02) (5.84)
Illiq -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-3.05) (-2.31) (-2.26) (-2.69) (-2.14) (-2.40) (-2.31) (-2.25)
Skew -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(-2.00) (-2.34) (-2.87) (-2.19) (-1.88) (-1.95) (-2.32) (-1.85)
N 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
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Table 2.18: Each month from July 1962 to November 2016 I run a firm-
level cross-sectional regression of the subsequent monthly excess return on
subsets of predictor variables including the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), capital
gain overhang measure (CGO), the residuals of streaks (Streak) orthogonal
to momentum, the interaction between the capital gain overhang and the
idiosyncratic volatility(CGO×IVOL), the interaction between the residuals
of streaks (Streak) orthogonal to momentum and the idiosyncratic measure
(Streak×IVOL), the market beta (Beta), the log market capitalization (Size), the
log book-to-market ratio (BTM), the momentum (MOM), the short-term reversal
(REV), the illiquidity (Illiq), the maximum daily return (MAX), the minimum
daily return (MIN), and the skewness (Skew). I normalize all variables in each
month to make the coefficients comparable. In each row, the table reports the
time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression slope coefficients and their
Newey-West corrected t-statistics (in parentheses). N denotes the number of
observations.
Orthognal to MOM
Streaks Based on Quarterly Returns
































I document a relation between the prior experience and the risk-return trade-off
motivated by the model of Rabin (2002). I assume that investors become more
risk-seeking for stocks in which they face prior negative experience. To create a
measure for prior experience, I estimate the purchase date of a stock and I calculate
the number of positive experience minus the number of negative experience divided
by the number of all prior experience since that date.
According to my hypotheses, I find that the negative risk-return relation is
concentrated among stocks owned by investors facing prior negative experience and
it is non-existing among stocks owned by investors facing prior positive experience.
These results contribute to a better understanding of the negative risk-return
relation and its variation in the cross-section of stock returns. The measure of prior
experience is quite similar to the capital gain overhang measure which estimates
the prior loss or gain that investors face for a stock. However, these two measures
capture two different concepts since the capital gain overhang measure is for the
total gain or loss, while the prior experience measure is about the number of
prior negative and positive changes that the investors face. I run several tests to
mitigate any concern that the results of the prior experience measure would be
driven by the capital gain overhang measure. I run double sorts to control for the
capital gain overhang measure and I find that the results remain highly significant.
I also perform several Fama-MacBeth regressions to control for the capital gain
overhang measure, its interaction with risk measures, and several other known
variables. I still find a highly significant relation between the prior experience and
the risk-return trade-off.
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Finally, I perform several test to explore the robustness of the results. I find
that the results remain significant for liquid and illiquid stocks, for the January
and non-January months, and for high and low sentiment time periods. I also
use several alternative measures for prior experience and I always find significant
results.
Prior experience and the gambler’s fallacy might have interesting implications
for option pricing, dynamic asset allocations or corporate finance because of its
well documented effect. Exploring these fields could be a promising exercise for
future research. I document a relation between the prior experience and the risk-
return trade-off motivated by the model of Rabin (2002). I assume that investors
become more risk-seeking for stocks in which they face prior negative experience.
To create a measure for prior experience, I estimate the purchase date of a stock
and I calculate the number of positive experience minus the number of negative
experience divided by the number of all prior experience since that date.
According to my hypotheses, I find that the negative risk-return relation is
concentrated among stocks owned by investors facing prior negative experience and
it is non-existing among stocks owned by investors facing prior positive experience.
These results contribute to a better understanding of the negative risk-return
relation and its variation in the cross-section of stock returns. The measure of prior
experience is quite similar to the capital gain overhang measure which estimates
the prior loss or gain that investors face for a stock. However, these two measures
capture two different concepts since the capital gain overhang measure is for the
total gain or loss, while the prior experience measure is about the number of
prior negative and positive changes that the investors face. I run several tests to
mitigate any concern that the results of the prior experience measure would be
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driven by the capital gain overhang measure. I run double sorts to control for the
capital gain overhang measure and I find that the results remain highly significant.
I also perform several Fama-MacBeth regressions to control for the capital gain
overhang measure, its interaction with risk measures, and several other known
variables. I still find a highly significant relation between the prior experience and
the risk-return trade-off.
Finally, I perform several test to explore the robustness of the results. I find
that the results remain significant for liquid and illiquid stocks, for the January
and non-January months, and for high and low sentiment time periods. I also
use several alternative measures for prior experience and I always find significant
results.
Prior experience and the gambler’s fallacy might have interesting implications
for option pricing, dynamic asset allocations or corporate finance because of its









Almost in every economic decision we have to take into account uncertainty and
delay in outcomes. Discounted expected utility as a normative theory prescribes
how to make these decisions. However, several violations of the descriptive validity
of discounted expected utility have been documented in both time and risk preferences
and even in their interactions. Time preferences exhibit immediacy, decreasing
discount rates (for example, hyperbolic discounting, Strotz, 1955; Loewenstein
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and Thaler, 1989; Ainslie, 1991) and subproportionality (Read and Roelofsma,
2003). At the same time, abundant experiments found several deviations from
expected utility which have been formalized by rank dependent utility (Quiggin,
1982), probability weighting (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999), and cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore, a series of violations have
been observed about the interaction of time and risk which couldn’t be explained
even by cumulative prospect theory or a decreasing discount rate. First, risk
tolerance increases with delay and for late uncertainty resolution (Ahlbrecht and
Weber, 1996; Noussair and Wu, 2006). Second, risk tolerance is lower for frequent
feedback than for one shot evaluation (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). Third, the
order of discounting and taking expected values influences the evaluation of future
prospects (Öncüler and Onay, 2009).
Although standard models in the field of economics have the implicit assumption
that time discounting and risk taking are independent, this assumption has been
challenged by empirical works. As a consequence, several studies attempt to
understand the relation between time discounting and risk taking in many different
economic problems.
For instance, people tolerate risk more in the distant future than in the short-
term, thus, the level of risk-aversion depends on the time horizon. Specifically,
Maronick (2007) finds that short-term insurance market is highly profitable for
retailers because of the high risk-aversion for short-term, while insurance in general
is less popular among consumers. It is also related to the economic problem why
people are willing to buy warranties for home appliances at a high price (Cicchetti
and Dubin, 1994) but spend too little on health insurance (Schoen, Hayes, Collins,
Lippa, and Radley, 2014) or why people seem to be strongly risk-averse in the
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field of investing in the short-term (Mehra and Prescott, 2003), while they do not
protect themselves financially against natural disasters which usually occur in the
long-term (Viscusi, 2010). In asset pricing, van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen
(2012) find that the price of near-term risk is higher than the price of long-term
risk. Motivated by this empirical evidence, Eisenbach and Schmalz (2016) suggest
a theory that relaxes the restriction of constant risk-aversion across time horizons.
However, this theory only focuses on the application of this single form of the
relation between time discounting and risk taking.
Another form of the relation between time discounting and risk taking when
people prefer uncertainty to resolve later than sooner (e.g., Lovallo and Kahneman,
2000). For instance, people tend to avoid information about the outcome of their
medical tests (Ganguly and Tasoff, 2016). This contradicts the standard models
of choice under risk which predict that people always prefer uncertainty to resolve
as early as possible to gain information.
In addition, impatience is higher for short-term than long-term which is usually
explained by the relation between risk taking and time discounting (e.g., Dasgupta
and Maskin, 2005). This phenomenon is also known as hyperbolic discounting that
is used to explain the decline in U.S. saving rates (Laibson, 1997) or certain human
behaviors such as addictions (Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998).
Understanding the relation between time discounting and risk taking can contribute
to better understanding of these economic problems.
There is a new trend in unifying time and risk preferences in a parsimonious
theoretical model to explain these anomalies based on an extension of prospect
theory (Halevy, 2008; Baucells and Heukamp, 2012; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2015).
In particular, we consider the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015).
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the descriptive validity of this model in an
experiment on a random sample of the subject pool consisting of a representative
sample of the Dutch population. The model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015)
incorporates survival probabilities of delayed outcomes as an additional source of
risk into prospect theory. This model provides a unified model to explain several
anomalies in the field of risk and time preferences, even in their interactions.
Assuming the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015), the estimated probability
weighting function should be the same for both risk and time preferences since
the model argues that there is one unified model which describes both behaviors.
In other words, subjects distort probabilities in a similar way when they face a
gamble or a survival risk with delayed outcomes. Thus, our main hypothesis is
that the probability weighting parameter is the same when estimated in risk or
time preferences.
To test this hypothesis, an experiment was run on a random sample of the
DNB Household Survey subject pool which consists of a representative sample of
the Dutch population. In the first part of the experiment, subjects valued gambles
to measure their risk preferences. In the second part, subjects valued the present
value of future payments to measure their time preference. Estimating the model
of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) for risk and time preferences separately, we find
that the estimated parameters from the two fields are positively correlated across
individuals and we can’t reject the hypothesis that they are the same.
The idea that future outcomes are inherently risky goes back to the nineteenth
century (Rae, 1834). Following the idea of a risky future, people could apply
discounting, for instance, because of the risk of death. As a consequence of this
case, discounting also reflects risk. For instance, Fuchs (1982) found a relationship
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between health of an individual and the individual’s discounting rate. Becker and
Mulligan (1997) argue that people with better health will have lower mortality and
that is why these people could afford to apply lower discount rates. Furthermore,
there are plenty of similarities between risk and time preferences (e.g., Prelec and
Loewenstein, 1991; Keren and Roelofsma, 1995).
Our contribution is at least two-fold even though there is some indirect evidence
for the relationship between time and risk preferences (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995)
even for the relationship between the probability weighting function and time
preferences (Epper, Fehr-Duda and Bruhin, 2011). First, Karen and Roelofsma
(1995) and Epper, Fehr-Duda, and Bruhin (2011) recruited students for their
experiments. We contribute to this literature by recruiting subjects from a representative
sample of the Dutch population. Second, prior researches find only indirect evidence
for the relationship between time and risk preference. We provide a direct evidence
on the relationship between time and risk preference in a representative sample
of the Dutch population by showing that the parsimonious model of Epper and
Fehr-Duda can account for both time and risk preferences in a unified model.
Although there is some indirect evidence on the link between risk taking and
time discounting, studies (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) did not find any
specification which could provide a direct link. Thus, testing the model of Epper
and Fehr-Duda (2015) not only might provide evidence on the link between risk
taking and time discounting but it could also provide the underlying mechanism
that links risk taking and time discounting.
Section 2 describes the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) and our main
hypothesis. Section 3 describes our experimental method and measures of preferences.
Section 4 describes the descriptive statistics of the data, while Section 5 describes
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our results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We follow the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) who consider binary gain
prospects P = (x1, p, x2) with payoffs x1 > x2 ≥ 0, where p is the probability of
the larger payoff and (1 − p) is the probability of the smaller payoff. Following
cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tverksy, 1992), when the payoffs are
played out and paid out immediately the value of such a prospect can be described
as:
V (P ) = w(p)u(x1) + [1− w(p)]u(x2) (3.1)
where u measures the utility of monetary outcomes x, with u(0) normalized to 0,
and w is the subjective probability function of p. Following the usual assumptions,
u and w are both monotonically increasing and w is twice differentiable with
w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. We apply the functional form of the subjective probability
weighting w(p) = e−(− ln(p))α of Prelec (1998).1 When the survival probability s is
equal to one we get the standard model in which risk taking and time discounting
are independent from each other.
Probability weighting is a key concept in the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda.
We use the functional form of the subjective probability weighting of Prelec (1998)
1Deriving their results, Epper and Fehr-Duda require subproportionality from the subjective
probability function w. Subproportionality holds for w(·) if and only if 1 ≥ p > q > 0 and
1 > λ > 0 imply the following inequality w(p)w(q) >
w(λp)
w(λq) . The subjective probability weighting
function proposed by Prelec (1998) is globally subproportional (for more details about subjective
probability weighting and subproportionality see Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012); Epper and Fehr-
Duda (2015))
136
with an α parameter w(p) = e−(− ln(p))α . This α parameter is non-negative (α ∈
[0,∞)) and there is no probability distortion if α = 1. In the case of α ∈
[0, 1), the decision-maker overweights small probabilities and underweights large
probabilities, while in the case of α ∈ (1,∞], the decision-maker underweights
small probabilities and overweights large probabilities. To illustrate the probability
weighting function, Figure 3.1 presents probability weighting functions for different
α parameters. According to the literature, in most of the cases, α < 1 which implies
the overweight of small probabilities and the underweight of large probabilities.
Figure 3.1: Subjective probability weighting functions w(p) = e−(− ln(p))α (Prelec,
1998) with different α parameters.
If the prospects are paid out in the future at time t > 0 then two more factors
are incorporated in the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015). The first factor is
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a discount weight ρ(t) = e−µt where µ ≥ 0 expresses a constant rate for delaying a
monetary payoff with time length t. The value of a prospect at present (indicated
by the subscript 0) when the payoffs are paid out in the future time t is
V0(P ) = [w(p)u(x1) + [1− w(p)]u(x2)]ρ(t) (3.2)
Following the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda, the second factor is the survival
probability. Let 0 < s ≤ 1 denote the probability of survival per period, which we
assume to be constant. This is the subject’s perceived probability that she will
actually receive the promised payoff by the end of the time period. Therefore, the
two-outcome prospect is perceived as a three-outcome prospect by the decision-
maker, described by P = (x1, pst;x2, (1 − p)st; 0), with a probability of pst to
receive the payoff of x1, a probability of (1− p)st to receive the payoff of x2, and
the zero outcome is the payoff when “something goes wrong” with a probability of
1− st.2
Now, the value of the prospect at t = 0, when the payoffs are paid out in the
future at time t, using u(0) = 0, is
V0(P ) = (w(ps
t)u(x1) + [w(ps
t + (1− p)st)− w(pst)]u(x2))ρ(t)










This model provides a description of risk, time preferences, and their interaction.
To investigate the descriptive validity of the model, we separately estimate it for
2The model can be generalized to n > 2 outcomes (Epper and Ferh-Duda, 2015).
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time and risk preferences. According to the model, we should get similar parameter
estimates for w(p) in the time and risk domains. The subjective probability
weighting function is postulated to be w(p) = e−(−ln(p))α (Prelec, 1998), where
α is the probability weighting parameter and the utility function is a power utility
function u(x) = xr, where r > 0 is the risk attitude parameter (see the discussion
by Wakker, 2008 p. 1335). In this specification, 1 > r > 0 means a risk-averse
attitude, r = 1 refers to a risk-neutral attitude, and r > 1 describes a risk-seeking
attitude.
To eliminate the effect of time preference, we set t = 0. Thus, the payoffs are
paid out instantaneously and the value of the prospect simplifies to equation (1).
According to the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015), the certainty equivalents
for different gambles can be described as follows, using x2 = 0,
u(CEi,j) = w(pj)u(x1) (3.4)
where CEi,j is the certainty equivalent value provided by the individual i for the
gamble j, αrisk,i is the probability weighting parameter for individual i, and ri is
the utility curvature for individual i. Substituting the functional forms for the
probability weighting, and the utility, we get the following specification for the
certainty equivalents in the domain of risk
(CEi,j)









This specification might contain errors which lead to the following econometric
specification, where εi,j,risk is the error term for individual i in gamble j which is






To eliminate the effect of risk, we set p = 1. In this case, the payoffs are delayed
sure amounts and their value is
V0(P ) = u(x1)w(s
t)ρ(t) (3.8)
According to Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015), assuming µ = 0 doesn’t affect
any of their conclusions about the existence of the link between time and risk
preference via the probability weighting and decreasing impatience (Epper and
Fehr-Duda, 2015, page 11). We will use the equation with setting µ = 0 to
simplify the estimation and reducing the number of parameters. Although it
doesn’t affect the existence of the link (Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2015) it might
affect our parameter estimates in the time preference. This simplification might
add additional noise to our estimate but the link seems to be strong enough even
in this approach. Estimating the model for time preference, we also apply Prelec’s
subjective probability weighting function (1998) and the power utility function
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(−(−(1/ri)1/αi,time×t×ln(s))αi,time ) = e(−(−t×ln(s
1/ri
1/αi,time ))αi,time ) (3.10)
In this equation we can only estimate s(1/r)(1/α) and α; we can’t estimate s and
r separately. Thus, we define s′ = s(1/r)(1/α) and we use the following non-linear
regression model to estimate the parameters by minimizing the sum of squared
errors, where the error term εi,t,time is assumed to be independent and identically





Under the model assumptions, αrisk = αtime is supposed to hold, since in a
unified model in equation (5) both risk from a gamble and risk from the uncertainty
of the future are supposed to be distorted in the same way. We test this hypothesis
and its robustness in section 5:
Hypothesis: αrisk = αtime
3Using the utility curvature from the risk preference tasks, we can also estimate s.
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3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment took place as part of the DNB Household online survey (DHS)
which is comparable to PSID in the USA. This subject pool, administered by
CenterData (Tilburg University), consists of a representative sample of the Dutch
population. We analyzed the answers of 361 subjects recruited as a random sub-
sample of the DHS. The number of subjects were determined based on the available
budget of e7500 for setting up the experiment plus the payment for the subjects.
The experiment consisted of certainty equivalents elicitation for risky gambles and
certainty equivalents elicitation for delayed payments. We used the same choice
menu format with 16 list items for eliciting certainty equivalents for risk and time
preferences to minimize the cognitive efforts to understand the tasks. The subjects
were provided several examples and details about the tasks in the introductions
to help them to get familiar with the questions (see the appendix for the general
instructions). Each type of questions was randomized and each question within
each type was also randomized to control for a potential ordering effect.
Each subject was paid based on his choice in a randomly selected question.
Subjects received their payment immediately for risky gambles and all delayed
payments were scheduled and paid by bank transfer from the account of CenterData.
All subjects were invited via Internet and they could fill out the survey at their
own pace. The median length of filling out the whole survey was 12 minutes 47
seconds and the average payment was e9.83. We didn’t provide any “show-up” fee
for the subjects. However, besides the payment of the experiment, the members
of the subject pool are remunerated for the participation in the subject pool.
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3.3.1 Elicitation of Certainty Equivalents for Risk Preference
Subjects were presented a 16 rows menu where each row presented a choice between
the same binary gamble L = (x1, p;x2) and a sure payment starting from the high
payment x1 = e15 to the low payment x2 = 0 with e1 decrements. Subjects had to
report in which row starting from the top (high payment) they preferred the gamble
first. The certainty equivalent was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the two
values around the respondent’s indifference point. In each gamble the payoffs were
the same (x1=e15, x2=e0) while p varies from 90% to 10% by 20% decrements.
The order of the five questions were counterbalanced in the experiment.
3.3.2 Elicitation of Present Values for Time Preference
Subjects were presented the same 16 rows menu where each row presented a choice
between the same future payment and an instant amount starting from the high
payment (x1=e15) to the low payment (x2=e0) with e1 decrements (see the
appendix for examples of the elicitation method). Subjects had to report again in
which row starting from the top (high payment) they preferred the future payment
first. The present value for the delayed payoff is the arithmetic mean of the two
values around the subject’s indifference point. There were only two tasks where
the subjects had to report their indifference point for e15 with a delay of 6 and
12 months. In any experiment involving time preference and delayed payoffs,
there could be a concern about the uncertainty of getting payment. However,
CenterData has frequent interactions with their members in the subjects pool
which mitigates the concern that any of the members would be doubtful about
the reliability of what has been told to them. In general, there is another concern
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in time preference when there is a transaction cost for the future payment. To
mitigate this concern, we applied scheduled bank transfers for both immediate
payments and delayed payments.
3.4 Summary Statistics
One of the big advantages of the subject pool of DHS is the large variation and
the detailed information about the subjects in the data. There are subjects from
the age of 16 to the age of 88. There is also a great variation in the monthly net
income of the subjects. Furthermore, there is a great variation in education.
Table 3.1: This table reports the averages, medians, standard deviations (Sd),
minimums (Min), maximums (Max), and the available number of observations
(N) of the demographic variables. The variable of Female is equal to 1 if the
subject is female, the monthly net income is denoted in euros, and the variable of
Higher education is equal to 1 if the subject holds a college or university degree.
Average Median Sd Min Max N
Age 57.22 59.5 16.31 16 88 361
Female 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 361
Monthly net income 1653 1700 998 0 6250 356
Higher education 0.36 0 0.48 0 1 360
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for various demographic variables.
Subjects could refuse to answer any of these questions. Some data come from the
experiment and some come from the surveys of DHS. Based on the subjects’ ID,
we can link their answers in the experiment to their answers in the regular surveys
of DHS. All subjects reported their age in categories from the category of 15-24
to 65+ in the experiment. We also have the year of birth for most of the subjects
in the DHS data. We use the year of birth when available (287 subjects out of
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361) and we assign the arithmetic mean of the interval of the category for each
subject otherwise. We assigned 73 to those subjects4 who reported the category
of 65+ without exact year of birth date. Subjects also reported their monthly
net income which varied from 0 to e6250 (the average gross income was e2152 in
the Netherlands in 2017 according to the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis5. However, five subjects refused to answer this question. The level of
education from primary school to university was also reported by the subjects. In
Table 3.1, we report the dummy variable of education whether the subject has a
degree from higher education. 36% of the subjects have a diploma from higher
education and one subject refused to answer this question.
This data was generated by sending 573 invitations to participate in the experiment
and 361 subjects completed the experiment. To investigate how our sample resembles
the parent sample, Table 3.2 reports the average values for our sample and the
rest of the sample and it also reports the p values for their differences. Some of
the variables and their number of observations are different from the rest of the
study because some of the information is only available for those who participated
in the experiment. Thus, we need to use those variables and observations that
are available in the original representative sample. Specifically, we need to use the
monthly household net income scaled from 1 to 6 instead of the logarithm of the
net income because the accurate personal net income information is only available
for those who participated in the experiment and some of the answers are not
available for some of the subjects. According to Table 3.2, there is no difference
between our sample and the rest of the sample for the monthly household income
473 is the average age for those who are older than 65 with available year of birth.
5https://www.cpb.nl/en
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and the gender ratio at the conventional 5% level. However, our sample contains
older and more educated subjects. To mitigate any concern that it might have
an impact on our results, we also control for these demographic variables in our
analyses.
Table 3.2: This table reports the averages, standard deviations (Sd) of the
demographic variables, and the number of observations available for both our
sample and for the rest of the original database of the representative sample of the
Dutch population. It also reports the p value for the difference between the two
samples based on the χ2 tests for the dummy variables and based on the t-statistics
of the non-dummy variables. The variable of Female is equal to 1 if the subject is
female, the monthly household net income is scaled from 1 to 6, and the variable
of Higher education is equal to 1 if the subject holds a college or university degree.
Our Sample Rest of the Sample
Average Sd N Average Sd N p
Age 57.36 0.87 352 51.11 0.29 3790 0.00
Female 0.46 0.03 353 0.51 0.01 4780 0.09
Monthly net income 4.04 0.07 308 3.96 0.02 2092 0.17
Higher education 0.36 0.03 352 0.26 0.01 4750 0.00
Subjects could also report how difficult or interesting they found the survey.
Table 3.3 reports the answers of 334 out of the 361 subjects who gave their answers
for these questions. Although 23% of the subjects answered that it was very
difficult to answer the questions there were less than 10% of the subjects who
didn’t find the questions clear at all. In most of the cases, the subjects find the
tasks interesting and enjoyable.
3.5 Results
In this section, we test our main hypothesis that estimating the model based on
risky choices and estimating the model based on intertemporal choices provide the
146
Table 3.3: This table reports the summary statistics of the reflections on the
experiment. These questions shows how difficult, clear, and interesting the
experiment was for the subjects.
1 2 3 4 5 Avg
Not at all Very much
Did you find it difficult to answer? 19% 17% 21% 18% 25% 3.12
Did you find the questions clear? 10% 15% 26% 26% 21% 3.31
Did it make you think a lot? 20% 16% 30% 20% 14% 2.93
Did you find the topic interesting? 13% 9% 26% 31% 22% 3.40
Did you find it enjoyable? 9% 6% 31% 29% 25% 3.57
same α parameter according to the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015). We
use several approaches to test our main hypothesis.
We estimate the parameters of the model for each individual and we test our
hypothesis that αtime = αrisk across individuals. In this case, we need to exclude
few subjects from these analyses. For instance, there is no estimate for αtime if a
subject asked for no compensation for the delays. We perform several additional
tests to investigate whether excluding these subjects yields a significantly different
sample. We find that the characteristics of the subjects do not differ between the
excluded subjects and the rest of the sample which indicates that the remaining
sample can also be considered as a representative sample of the Dutch population.
To test that αtime = αrisk, we perform both OLS and IV regressions including
controls for several subjects’ characteristics. We perform IV regressions to control
for the potential bias arising from the problem that both αtime and αrisk are not
observed but estimated. To mitigate any concern that the excluded observations
can have an effect on our results or that few subject’s answers can drive our results,
we also estimate the parameters of the model assuming that the parameters of the
model is the same for each individual. In this case, we do not exclude any subject
and our estimates for αtime and αrisk depend less on an extreme answer of a subject.
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Using both non-linear least squares method and GMM to estimate the parameters,
assuming that the parameters of the model is the same for each individual, also
support our hypothesis.
3.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
In this section, we estimate the parameters of the model for each individual using
equation (3.7) and (3.11). There are two special cases using this approach. The
first case is when the estimated s′ = 1. In this case, the αtime parameter is not
uniquely identified in the model. We find 79 out 361 subjects with estimates s′ = 1
and we exclude them. Second, we exclude subjects with estimates r = 0 from our
sample (16 out of 361 subjects). The estimate of r converges to zero only if subjects
provided a certainty equivalent of 15 for each task in the risk preferences. We also
exclude subjects without information on their income (5 out of 361) or on their
educational level (1 out of 361).
First, we investigate the possible characteristics of the subjects which could
predict whether he or she is excluded because of an estimated parameter of s′ = 1
or r = 0. Second, we present summary statistics of the subjects after exclusion.
Third, we present the results of our main question on the relationship between the
estimated α parameters.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the logistic regression to predict whether a
subject is more or less likely to have s′ = 1, r = 0, or any of them based on age,
gender, income, and level of education. Using the sample of the subjects whose
estimated parameters are s′ < 1 and r > 0 might lead to a sub-sample which is not
a random sample from the representative sample of the Dutch population anymore.
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However, according to Table 3.4, none of the demographic variables is a significant
predictor of the exclusion of the subjects. It suggests that the excluded subjects
are a random sub-sample of the subjects and the sample of the remaining subjects
is still a random sample of the representative sample of the Dutch population.
Table 3.4: This table reports the results of the logistic regressions of a dummy
variable of s′ = 1 or r = 0, and a dummy variable of s′ = 1 or r = 0 on several
demographic variables, standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
s′ = 1 r = 0 s′ = 1 or r = 0
Age 1.031 0.962 1.045
(0.059) (0.092) (0.059)
Age2 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.819 0.459 0.781
(0.232) (0.284) (0.219)
Log − Income 1.361 0.840 1.286
(0.457) (0.566) (0.416)
Log − Income2 0.976 1.013 0.979
(0.040) (0.089) (0.039)
Higher − Education 1.258 0.392 1.188
(0.358) (0.268) (0.335)
Constant 0.055 0.237 0.058
(0.087) (0.568) (0.089)
Observations 356 356 356
Parameters 7 7 7
Prob > χ2 0.47 0.49 0.62
Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics for the estimated parameters. There
are several striking patterns in the distribution of the parameters. First, the
parameter of αrisk is zero for a large portion of the subjects. It suggests that there
were a large portion of subjects who did not understand the questions correctly
or they apply extreme probability weighting. Second, there are large standard
deviations for αrisk and αtime. There are also large differences between the mean
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and the median suggesting that the distributions of these variables are positively
skewed with possibly some outliers. An extremely high αrisk parameter indicates
that the subject considers the higher probabilities almost constantly close to 1,
while the subject considers the small probabilities almost constantly close to zero.
The average αrisk is 0.68 which is close to what the literature documents (0.435
Donkers, Melenberg, and Van Soest, 2001; 0.48 Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; 0.589
Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; 0.505 Epper, Fehr-Duda, and Bruhin, 2011; 0.63
Abdellaoui, Diecidue, and Öncüler, 2011; 0.879 Jullien and Salanie, 2000), however
the standard deviation is much larger for the αrisk estimates in our sample. This
might be the consequence of the few questions that we use for estimation or of the
large variety of the subjects which might increase the noise in the data. Third, the
distribution of s′ is quite extreme with fat tails. A large number of observations
of s′ is close6 to one indicating that most of the subjects expect to receive the
promised amount of money. However, more than 5% of the estimates of s′ are
close to zero. Fourth, the average utility curvature parameter is larger than one
which is hard to interpret in the presence of probability weighting. Other scholars
find similar utility curvature parameter in the presence of probability weighting
(e.g., Abdellaoui, Diecidue, and Öncüler, 2011). Finally, Figure 3.2 displays the
histogram of the difference of αrisk and αtime within subjects. Most of the subjects
have a small difference between the two estimates; however, there are several
subjects who have very different values for these parameters. In addition to our
descriptive statistics, we find a positive and significant correlation for both Pearson
(0.26) and Spearman (0.14) correlation between the estimated αrisk and αtime
6We present 1.00 (0.00) when it was rounded to 1 (0) and we display 1 (0) when the value
was exactly 1 (0).
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parameters.
Table 3.5: This table reports the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th percentiles and the
mean, the standard deviation, the maximum, the minimum, and the number of
observations of the estimated parameters of αrisk, αtime, 1/r, and s′.
αrisk 1/r s
′ αtime
5% 0 0.16 0.00 0.04
25% 0 0.36 0.63 0.13
50% 0.31 0.55 0.88 0.37
75% 0.78 0.79 1.00 1.40
95% 1.74 1.82 1.00 10.58
Mean 0.67 0.71 0.75 1.63
Sd 1.61 0.66 0.33 3.16
Max 20.85 3.41 1.00 14.51
Min 0 0.00 0.00 0
N 273 273 273 273
3.5.2 Relationship between Risk and Time Preferences
To address the main research question of the paper, we investigate the link between
αtime and αrisk using instrumental variable (IV) and OLS regressions. Table 3.6
reports the regression of αtime on αrisk and a set of control variables such as gender,
age, logarithm of the net monthly income, and the dummy of higher education.
Table 3.7 reports the regression of αrisk on αtime and a set of several control
variables. We use instrumental variable regression to control for the possible bias
that might occur because our αrisk and αtime parameters are not observed but
estimated. We use the answer for the gamble in which the better outcome happens
with probability of 70% as an instrumental variable for αrisk (the correlation of the
answer for that and estimated αrisk is 0.31) when αrisk is one of the independent
variables. We use the present value answer of delayed payoff with 6 months as
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the difference of αrisk and αtime (i.e. αrisk − αtime)
an instrumental variable for αtime (correlation is 0.33) when αtime is one of the
independent variables.
According to the first column in Table 3.6, there is a significant positive
relationship between αrisk and αtime and the coefficient of αrisk is close to 1 as
the theory predicts (αrisk = 1,χ2 = 0.11, p = 0.74).
One might argue that these results are driven by those subjects who didn’t
understand or didn’t enjoy the tasks. To mitigate this concern, we include the
answers for the five questions about the clarity of the tasks as dummy variables
presented in column 2 in Table 3.6. These dummy variables capture the degree to
which subjects perceived these tasks difficult, unclear, and boring. The coefficient
of αrisk remains significant and close to 1 (the coefficient of αrisk is not different
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Table 3.6: This table reports estimation results for the IV and OLS regressions of
αtime on αrisk and several control variables. It presents the link between αtime and
αrisk even after controlling for a set of control variables. IV regressions account for
the fact that αrisk is an estimated observation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
IV OLS
αtime αtime αtime αtime αtime αtime
αrisk 1.13*** 1.20** 1.26** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.55**
(0.39) (0.51) (0.54) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21)
Female -0.69 -0.65 -0.52 -0.62 -0.77 -0.71
(0.40) (0.42) (0.46) (0.38) (0.42) (0.45)
Age 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08)
Age2 - - 0.00 - - -0.00
- - (0.00) - - (0.00)
Log − Income -0.05 -0.05 -0.46 -0.05 -0.03 -0.32
(0.09) (0.09) (0.49) (0.09) (0.09) (0.51)
Log − Income2 - - 0.05 - - 0.04
- - (0.06) - - (0.07)
Higher − Education -0.82 -0.85* - -0.58 -0.70 -
(0.45) (0.44) - (0.41) (0.44) -
Constant 1.10 0.34 1.53 1.24 0.98 1.26
(0.90) (0.24) (0.66) (0.86) (1.40) (2.40)
Clarity No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education− Levels No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 273 249 249 273 249 249
Parameters 6 26 32 6 26 32
R2 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.17
from one: χ2 = 0.16, p = 0.69). This relationship remains similar even if we extend
the control variables beyond the questions about the clarity of the tasks with a
more detailed control for education (including dummy variable for primary, two
different types of secondary school, college, and university level) and the squared
value of age and the logarithm of the net income. In column 3 in Table 3.6, we
present the regression where all control variables are included. The coefficient
of αrisk is still significant, positive, and close to 1 (the coefficient of αrisk is not
different from one: χ2 = 0.24, p = 0.62). Table 3.6 also reports the coefficients of
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the OLS regressions to compare the results with instrumental variable coefficients.
There is also a positive and significant coefficient on αrisk as in the instrumental
variable case. However, it can be rejected at the 5% level that it is equal to 1.
We also document a much lower standard error for the αrisk coefficient in each
specification for the OLS regressions. These differences between the standard
errors of the IV and OLS regressions suggest that it is important to control for the
potential bias when we use αrisk as an independent variable.
We also perform IV and OLS regressions of αrisk on αtime including several
control variables to investigate the robustness of our previous results. We use the
answer for the gamble which has 70% probability for the better outcome for αrisk
as an instrumental variable in Table 5 and the present value for the 6 months
delayed payoff for αtime as an instrumental variable in Table 6. We report the
results in Table 3.7. There is a positive and significant relationship between αrisk
and αtime at a 5% level in each case. However, we can reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient is equal to 1 in each specification. In this case, the IV and OLS
regressions provide similar αrisk coefficients with similar standard errors. αtime is
a noisier estimate 7 probably because it is also based on less observations than
αrisk. This might be the reason why the coefficients of αtime in Table 3.7 are
smaller compared to the coefficients of αrisk in Table 3.6 and not close to one.
Another interesting difference between the results of Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 is
that education and age become significant predictors of αrisk in Table 3.7, while
none of the demographic variables could predict αtime in Table 3.6. It suggests
that αrisk can capture most of the variation in αtime which makes all the other
variable insignificant, while αtime can not capture most of the variation of αrisk
7σ2αtime = 9.98 and σ
2
αrisk
= 2.59, we can reject that σ2αrisk = σ
2
αtime , f = 0.259, p = 0.000.
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which helps other variables to predict partly the variation of αrisk. This might
again come from that αtime variable is a noisier estimate than αrisk. All these
results suggest that IV regressions in Table 3.6 provide the best specification to
test our main hypothesis.8
These results suggest that assuming a survival probability and probability
weighting can provide a direct link between risk taking and time discounting. First
of all, these results provide additional novel evidence on the existence of a link
between risk taking and time discounting. Second, it also provides a mechanism
for such a link. Thus, it also suggests that models that assume independence
between risk taking and time discounting have to be reconsidered.
3.5.3 Systematic Deviation from the Model
In this section, we investigate whether any characteristic of the subjects can explain
the difference between the two alphas in Table 3.8. Regressing the difference of
αrisk and αtime on several characteristics of the subjects, we find that there is no
systematic predictor for the difference. We also regress the absolute value of the
difference of αrisk and αtime on several characteristics of the subjects to investigate
whether some of the characteristics predict the deviation from the model. One
could argue that our results are driven by certain type of subjects. For instance,
less educated people provide noisier answers which could make αtime and αrisk more
8There is a lot of noise in both the answers of the experiment and the parameter estimates
according to the summary statistics. It raises the concern that our main result might have been
influenced by the noise. To explore this concern, we run a placebo test. Specifically, we generate
random answers for the time questions for each subject and we run the same IV regression as
in the first column of Table 6. We repeat this exercise 1000 times and we find that a positive
relationship between αrisk and αtime in 5.1% of the cases for the 5% significance level and in
1.9% of the cases for the 2.5% significance level. It suggests that noise does not help to get
significant results in these tests.
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Table 3.7: This table reports estimation results for the IV and OLS regressions of
αrisk on αtime and several control variables. It presents the link between αtime and
αrisk even after controlling for a set of control variables. IV regressions account for
the fact that αtime is an estimated observation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
IV OLS
αrisk αrisk αrisk αrisk αrisk αrisk
αtime 0.19*** 0.13** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.22 -0.08 -0.16 0.19 -0.13 -0.23
(0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
Age -0.00 -0.01 0.06** 0.00 -0.01 0.07***
(-0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Age2 - - - - -0.00***
- - (0.00) - - (0.00)
Log − Income 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.21
(0.04) (0.03) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16)
Log − Income2 - - -0.03 - - -0.02
- - (0.02) - - (0.02)
Higher − Education 0.49** 0.31** - 0.47** 0.27 -
(0.21) (0.14) - (0.21) (0.14) -
Constant -0.03 0.82 -0.51 0.04 0.92** -0.44
(0.45) (0.43) (0.73) (0.44) (0.44) (0.75)
Clarity No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education− Levels No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 273 249 249 273 249 249
Parameters 6 26 32 6 26 32
R2 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.18
similar or less similar because of random answers. We find no evidence that any
of these characteristics would predict the deviation. Similarly, we find no evidence
that any of these characteristics would predict the estimated survival probability
(s′) or the risk aversion parameter.
Surprisingly, as Table 3.9 shows, there is no significant Spearman correlation
between any of the questions about the clarity of the tasks and the difference
between αrisk and αtime or the absolute value of the difference of αrisk and αtime
which suggests that our results are not affected by the level of clarity of the tasks
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Table 3.8: This table reports the OLS estimation results for the regressions of the
difference, the absolute value of the difference of αrisk and αtime, s′, and 1/r on a
set of demographic characteristics. It presents that there is no relation between
these estimated parameters and the demographic characteristics of the subjects.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
αrisk-αtime |αrisk-αtime| s′ 1/r
Gender 0.67 -0.52 -0.07 0.06
(0.39) (0.36) (0.04) (0.08)
Age -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Log − Income 0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00
(0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
Higher − Education 0.77 -0.45 -0.01 0.04
(0.41) (0.38) (0.04) (0.09)
Constant -1.12 1.45 0.80*** 0.86***
(0.88) (0.81) (0.09) (0.19)
Observations 273 273 273 273
Parameters 5 5 5 5
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
for a subject.
3.5.4 Robustness
In this section, we test the hypothesis αrisk = αtime assuming that there is one
value for each parameter that fits all individuals’ preferences and only noise in the
model generates differences across the individuals’ responses. We estimate this
model both using non-linear least squares and Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). We do not exclude any observation in this specification since this method
can also handle special cases such as s′ = 1 (excluding these observations leads to








+ εi,j,t, where D is equal to
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Table 3.9: This table reports the Spearman correlations between the question
about the tasks and the difference and the absolute value of the difference of
αrisk and αtime. It presents that there is no relationship between those have large
difference between αrisk and αtime and those who did not understand the tasks or
did not like these type of tasks. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
αrisk-αtime |αrisk-αtime|
Did you find it difficult to answer? -0.02 0.04
Did you find the questions clear? -0.00 -0.02
Did it make you think a lot? 0.05 0.01
Did you find the topic interesting? -0.03 0.05
Did you find it enjoyable? 0.01 0.08
1 in the case of an answer for an intertemporal choice and zero otherwise, and εi,j,t
is the error term which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed
with zero mean, variances of σ2.
Table 3.10: This table reports the parameter estimates assuming that each
parameter has the same value for each individual using non-linear least square














Table 3.10 reports the estimation results for the joint estimates for αrisk and
αtime (αtime is the sum of αrisk and αchange). First of all, αrisk and αtime indicate
strong probability weighting. Second, αrisk and αtime are close to each other since
the deviation is not significant (p = 0.61). We can’t reject the hypothesis that
they are the same at any conventional level. Thus, this approach also supports
our main hypothesis. The value of 0.52 for 1/r is similar to the average value of the
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individual estimates. Finally, the estimated survival probability after adjusting for
the utility curvature and the probability distortion s = 0.975 which is higher than
the median or average individual estimates.
To explore the parameter estimates, we also estimate α assuming that all
individuals using the same parameters and the same α = αrisk = αtime in both risk
and time domain, where εi,j,t is the error term which is assumed to be independent,




t))α + εi,j,t (3.12)
Table 3.11 reports the estimation results of equation (3.12). The joint estimate
for the probability distortion α is between the estimate for the probability distortion
risk and time. The utility curvature is also almost the same in the joint estimates
as in the previous one, however, the survival probability is much lower.
Table 3.11: This table reports the parameter estimates assuming that each
parameter has the same value for each individual and that one α can describe









In the next two tables, we report similar estimations to the non-linear least
squares method, but using GMM. In this case, we use seven moment conditions,
where each moment condition is based on a certainty equivalent using the risk or










t))αtime ) = 0) for j = 6, 7.
Table 3.12 reports the estimation results without imposing αrisk = αtime. First
of all, αrisk and αtime are small and similar to the estimates in the non-linear least
squares method. Second, αrisk and αtime are close to each other in this case as well
and we can not reject the hypothesis that they are the same (p = 0.64). The utility
curvature and the survival probability estimates are not significantly different from
the estimates in the non-linear least squares method.
Table 3.12: This table reports the parameter estimates assuming that
each parameter has the same value for each individual using the general
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Table 3.12 reports the results with GMM imposing αrisk = αtime = α. The
joint estimates for the probability distortion α is between the estimates for the
probability distortion risk and time. Thus, the estimates of the GMM provide the
same implications as the non-linear least squares method.
Overall, we conclude that estimating the parameters assuming that there is
one value for each parameter that fits all individuals’ preferences yields the same
conclusions as in our main results. Although the standard errors of the parameter
estimates are lower in this approach the estimated probability weighting parameter
based on time preferences is equal to the estimated probability weighting parameter
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Table 3.13: This table reports the parameter estimates assuming that each
parameter has the same value for each individual and that one α can describe both









in risk preferences as the theory predicts.
3.6 Conclusion
We find significant relationships among the behavior in time and risk preference
tasks as the theory of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) predicts. It provides an
experimental evidence for the descriptive validity of their model even after controlling
for several different variables such as gender, age, education, income, clarity of the
tasks in a representative sample of the Dutch population. This suggests that the
model of Epper and Fehr-Duda provides not only an explanation for several known
anomalies but it also captures their driving force.
First of all, we find that risk and probability weighting have an impact on time
discounting in line withe the model of Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015).
Second, according to these results, economic models should consider the effect
of the interaction between risk and time when both are present in a model. In
other words, modeling risk also depends on the time dimension and they are not
independent. The model of Epper and Fehr-Duda provides explanation for several
puzzles in the experimental economics literature; however, it might also help to
161
resolve other puzzles in the literature by providing a parsimonious model for their
interaction. For instance, it can resolve why people exhibit strong risk-aversion in
some of their actions while seeking out risk in others.
Third, these results suggest a new way of looking at time discounting yielding
several new testable hypotheses. For instance, uncertainty plays an important role
in time discounting. Higher uncertainty leads to stronger hyperbolic discounting.
Another consequence of the results is that the perceived risk depends on the timing
of the outcome. This could be important in long term economic decisions such as




In this experiment, you are asked to make 8 choices. The 8 choices are divided
into three parts. In the end, one of the questions will be randomly picked and you
are going to be paid by bank transfer based on your answer in that question.
We show you an example of the format of "choice list" in which most of the
questions will be presented. Please, read carefully the instructions.
In this format, there are two options, labeled LEFT and RIGHT. The options
will be grouped together in a list with 16 rows. An example list is given below.
This example is not a list that you will actually encounter during the experiment,
but merely illustrates the format.
As you can see, in the example list, LEFT is the same gamble in each row.
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RIGHT yields different amounts of euros. In particular, as you move down the list,
the amount of euros offered by RIGHT decreases, starting at e15 and decreasing
in steps of e1 to e0.
Starting from the top row (row 15), you can decide in each row whether you
prefer LEFT (the gamble) or RIGHT (a given amount of sure money today). We
are interested in the first row when you prefer LEFT (the gamble) to RIGHT.
Let’s assume that you have the following logic, in the top row (row 15) you
prefer RIGHT (sure e15) to LEFT (the gamble). In the next row (row 14), you
still prefer RIGHT (sure e14) to LEFT (the gamble). Then again in row 13, you
prefer RIGHT (e13) to LEFT (the gamble). But in row 12, you think that your
prefer LEFT (playing the gamble) to RIGHT (e12). In this case, you are supposed
to type 12 as the first row where you prefer LEFT to RIGHT. We assume that
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once you prefer LEFT to RIGHT you will always prefer LEFT to RIGHT for the
rest of the rows.
If this question was randomly selected then one of the rows will be randomly
picked and your payment will be based on your choice in that row. For example,
if this example choice is selected to be paid (according to the example you typed
12) and row 13 is randomly picked, you will get the option RIGHT, resulting in
e13 for sure. On the other hand if this example choice is selected to be paid and
row 4 is randomly picked, you will get LEFT, resulting in the gamble that pays
you e15 if the dice shows a number from 1 to 12 and e0 when the dice shows a
number from 13 to 20.
In this format, we ask you to report the first row, starting from the top row,
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